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Srebrenica As Discourse: An Ethnography of Power
Suzanne Elaine Petrusic, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2021 
The literature on power and resistance has long struggled to define discursive power as 
separate from the resistance used to influence it. Many studies have placed the individuals 
they’ve studied in the position of either being powerful or powerless in an effort to document, 
understand, and theorize both discursive power and resistance. Rather than placing individuals 
in positions of powerfulness or powerlessness, this research centers the discourse as power 
itself using Foucault’s theoretical framework on discursive formations. It examines the objects, 
authorities, and concepts endorsed by, on the one hand, a group of marginalized local residents 
of Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other hand, a series of international visitors 
to the infamous town. Through interviews, ethnography, and participant observation, both 
groups are treated as equally powerful users and subjects of discourse. By examining the 
discursive power of each group and watching as individuals from each group try to influence 
each other’s image of Srebrenica, the research examines strategies of discursive influence and 
resistance, identifying a methodology for studying power that is promising for future research. 
v 
Table of Contents 
1.0 Chapter 1: Introduction, Theoretical Framework, and Methodology ......................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................ 4 
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................... 12 
2.0 Chapter 2: The ‘Object’ of Srebrenica ............................................................................. 29 
2.1 The Local Residents’ Object ..................................................................................... 29 
2.2 The International Visitors’ Object .......................................................................... 33 
2.3 Comparison .................................................................................................................. 39 
2.4 Attempts to Influence Others’ Objects ................................................................... 42 
3.0 Chapter 3: The ‘Authorities’ on Srebrenica ................................................................... 46 
3.1 The Local Residents’ Authorities ............................................................................ 46 
3.2 The International Visitors’ Authorities .................................................................. 48 
3.3 Comparison .................................................................................................................. 50 
3.4 Attempts to Influence Others’ Authorities ............................................................ 51 
4.0 Chapter 4: The ‘Concepts’ of Srebrenica ........................................................................ 59 
4.1 The Local Residents’ Concepts ................................................................................ 59 
4.2 The International Visitors’ Concepts ...................................................................... 67 
4.3 Comparison .................................................................................................................. 75 
vi 
4.4 Attempts to Influence Others’ Concepts ................................................................ 85 
5.0 Chapter 5: Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 100 
5.1 Interplay Between Objects, Authorities, and Concepts .................................... 100 
5.2 Important Contextual Factors ................................................................................. 106 
5.3 Implications ............................................................................................................... 111 
Appendix A: List of Interviews and Participant Observations Completed ................ 116 
Appendix B: Interview Questionnaires .............................................................................. 118 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 120 
vii 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: Time Orientation of Respondent, n = 67 ........................................................... 41 
Figure 4.1: Local Residents' Concepts (Number of Utterances by Topic), n = 80 .......... 60 
Figure 4.2: International Visitors' Concepts, n = 75 ............................................................ 67 
Figure 4.3: Comparison of Local and International Concepts (% of Mentions by Topic), 
n = 155) ............................................................................................................................. 76 
Figure 4.4: Giorgia's Drawing of the "Every Woman" ........................................................ 94 
1 
1.0 Chapter 1: Introduction, Theoretical Framework, and Methodology 
 Introduction 
Back in 2012, in completing my field work for my Master’s thesis, I had the experience in 
Srebrenica of quite a few local residents telling me that they don’t have a problem with ethnic 
identity. That statement, and the passion with which it was usually spoken, was often 
bewildering, mostly because I hadn’t asked them about ethnic identity in the first place. 
Through time, reflection, and analysis, it occurred to me that they were expecting me to ask 
about ethnic identity, probably because I am an international visitor, and those visitors are 
known to want to talk a lot about ethnic identity. That they had assumed I would want to talk 
about it planted a question in my mind, which eventually grew into the work that produced 
this dissertation.  
The dissertation could have taken many different forms, anchoring into any one of a 
number of literatures related to nationalism, anarchy and the role of the state, ethnic conflict 
and post-conflict peacebuilding. On the literature on nationalism, the data I have collected 
could go far to demonstrate how groupism has led theories of nationalism astray from really 
beginning to understand what drives massive political change in the context of the 
institutionalized, international state system. For the literature on anarchy and the role of the 
state, the data here could contribute to further understanding on how local sensemaking and 
systems of power maintain state power, but also how they can change drastically (for example, 
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from privileging class identities as in the former Yugoslavia to privileging ethnic identities in 
Bosnia). The data can also demonstrate the sensemaking that remains the same culturally at the 
foundation of society even when political apparatuses change and seem to signal nothing is the 
same (again, for example, the Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia). 
The literature on ethnic conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding focuses on the role of 
the state and ethnic identity in causing conflict, and as cause, presumes the state, and its most 
mature expression—democracy—is the solution. When that solution fails to secure peace, the 
peacebuilding literature often presumes democracy simply wasn’t implemented fully or well. I 
think the data I collected could also speak to the literature that critically examines whether 
democracy is a substantive good or a procedural solution.  
Because it is so very rich, ethnographic research can be richly applicable across a broad 
swath of literature. Alas, the literature I chose for the dissertation was that on power and 
resistance, and in the beginning, it was a question about power and resistance, about how 
powerless people try to resist the powerful. Rather than casting international visitors as 
powerful, with the discourse on Srebrenica they bring with them somehow privileged in 
interactions with local residents, whose discourse is powerless, I began to understand the 
situation from the perspective Lughod (1990) suggests. I saw that both international visitors and 
local residents were using their own understanding of Srebrenica in their interactions, and 
sometimes, when it seemed they were different, they both tried to influence each other. 
That is, it never seemed to be the case, or at least I could not find evidence of it, that one 
or the other was, in their interactions with each other, more or less privileged regarding power. 
To the extent that language is power, in the most Foucauldian sense, because both visitors and 
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residents had access to language, they could both be powerful and influence each other using 
discourse. These were multiple discourses of Srebrenica, and given the unique circumstances 
surrounding Srebrenica, those different ways of understanding Srebrenica often came into 
contact with each other, which had led to those local residents’ unsolicited statements to me that 
they don’t have a problem with ethnic identity after all.  
For this dissertation, my starting position is that there is a difference between the reality 
that is Srebrenica the city and the discourses that try to define Srebrenica in the minds of 
different people. Srebrenica itself has become a contested discourse. As a reality, Srebrenica 
itself is a remote city with its own reality, but it has emerged as its own discourse both locally 
and internationally. In this work, I first outline relevant elements of Foucault’s theory of power 
as a theoretical framework for the study. Then, in the next few chapters, I look at those elements 
from both perspectives, identifying them and comparing them.  
Then, I examine what happens when these two images of Srebrenica meet—how they 
interact, and sometimes, how international visitors and local residents use them to influence 
each other. In this way, I bring new meaning to the assertion that resistance is power by showing 
that this is quite literally true: what we see as ‘resistance’ is really the use of one field of 
discursive power to influence a different field of discursive power. In that sense, this study is 
less an ethnography of Srebrenica, and more an ethnography of power. 
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 Theoretical Framework 
Simply stated, this dissertation explores how people try to influence each other when at 
least one of them thinks they disagree with how another person sees the world. In academic 
terms, it explores Foucauldian power and resistance to it. This study takes Foucault’s work on 
power and some of the literature that flows from it as its orienting framework. In particular, I 
draw inspiration heavily from The Archaeology of Knowledge, History of Sexuality, Madness and 
Civilization, and The Birth of the Clinic.1 One major concept from this work is called a discursive 
formation (Foucault 2002[1969]: Chapter 2). Simply put, a discursive formation is the set of 
rules that determines what kinds of things we pay attention to and ensure that we continue to 
pay attention to those things.  
Madness and Civilization, for example, looked at the set of rules and norms of society that 
led the field of psychopathology and then larger society to pay attention to ‘madness.’ A History 
of Sexuality looked at the set of rules and norms of society that led society to recognize intimate 
behaviors and focus on them as sexuality. Foucault was trying to identify how the very reality 
of seemingly peculiar behavior became known as ‘madness’ or ‘sexuality’ in the first place.  
His biggest point was that the presence or reality of so-called peculiar behavior did not 
necessarily warrant the volume or the character of the attention that madness or sexuality 
eventually achieved. He wanted to uncover what it was exactly that led to that volume and 
 
1 This body of work has rightly been criticized for the vagueness of the terms it often uses. In order to 
have a conversation about this work, I use these terms, but I try to use them as little as possible and 
instead use more colloquial vocabulary in its place.  
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character of attention given to that behavior such that it became known as madness or sexuality. 
By doing so, he would eventually expose how arbitrary the set of rules were that determined 
that madness or sexuality should be something people generally pay special attention to.  
But in order to do so, he had to solve a very difficult methodological problem. He had to 
identify the kind of data he should collect to study madness. He knew that all the data he could 
collect about madness itself would have presumed just that set of rules he was curious to 
uncover in the first place. The data set, if it focused on examples of madness or sexuality, would 
effectively disguise from him the very thing he was interested in studying—the set of rules that 
had produced them as examples in the first place.  
To get around that problem, Foucault focused instead on understanding three things. 
First, he wanted to understand how, when, and where those seemingly unusual behaviors 
began to systematically be understood as madness or sexuality. In his terms, he called this 
understanding the formation of objects.2 In trying to reveal the formation of these objects, 
Foucault was answering questions about who began to notice madness, where in society they 
began to see it, and how they categorized and structured knowledge about madness.  
In the nineteenth century, it was the family, social groups, work situations, and the 
religious communities that likely identified ‘peculiar’ behaviors, which later became referred to 
as madness. They were able to identify what seemed ‘normal’ and against this background 
called attention to what seemed to be unusual behavior. At the same time, new spaces in society 
 
2 For simplicity, I refer to this simply as ‘objects’ throughout the dissertation. 
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were emerging— space for art or for penality, for example. Those places gave madness a space 
to emerge, where it could be become an object of attention.  
Those who drew attention to and suggested a need to focus on madness obviously 
included the institution of medicine, but the legal profession and religious authorities did so as 
well. Importantly, these institutions were afforded recognition by the public as major 
authorities on the topic. In addition to knowing where and when and by whose direction 
madness emerged, it is also important to understand how madness was categorized. To 
categorize and understand madness, one had to know more about a person’s soul, body, 
personhood, and their personal history.  
Second, Foucault wanted to understand who could speak with authority about madness 
or sexuality, what places and roles in society they had to occupy in order to have that authority, 
and who in society recognized them as authorities. In his terms, he called this understanding 
the formation of enunciative modalities, but I will refer to this simply as “authority” for the rest 
of this dissertation.  
For example, for disease, the answer was firstly the doctor, a status granted to persons 
through demonstrated competence and knowledge, granted by certain institutions, and 
practiced through particular relationships with other institutions. For madness in particular, he 
identified authorities such as psychiatrists. But members of the judiciary and the church were 
also recognized as authorities on madness.  
 Also important to the question of authority are the sites from which authority could be 
exercised. In the field of medicine, doctors, who are afforded a particular authority to speak 
about disease, can do so from hospitals, private practices, laboratories, and the ‘library’ or 
7 
archive of documents related to the medical field. There was a time they could also speak from 
private homes.  
The roles these authorities can assume is also an important aspect for understanding the 
authority related to a discourse. In the medical and psychiatric context, the doctor takes the 
position of the authority who questions the patient, listens to the patient’s responses, and who 
takes an objective perspective removed far enough to determine the relevant from the 
irrelevant. The doctor can take up and operate instruments in practice. And the doctor can 
disperse information. 
Third, Foucault wanted to understand how different ideas related to madness or 
sexuality. In his terms, he called this the formation of concepts, but I will refer to this simply as 
‘concepts’ for the rest of the dissertation. He was keen to identify how ideas related to madness 
and sexuality came to be related to them in the first place, to understand how those ideas or 
concepts related to one another, and then to understand how those concepts become 
‘knowledge.’  
For example, Foucault [(2002[1969]:63)] describes how Natural History has a  
general arrangement of the statements, … a set of rules for arranging statements in 
series, an obligatory set of schemata of dependence, of order, and of successions, in 
which the recurrent elements that have value as concepts were distributed.  
 
Some concepts systematically precede or succeed others, are hierarchically arranged, or 
are systematically negated by others. (Foucault (2000)[1969]: 64 – 65). Concepts can become 
knowledge in a myriad of ways—one can take descriptions from the past and put them into 
new contexts, take natural language and make it formal, translate quantitative data into 
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qualitative statements and descriptions, or make knowledge about a concept ever more 
detailed.  
Foucault developed this methodology for understanding the sets of rules that emerged 
around sexuality, madness, or natural history because he was interested primarily in revealing 
how things like madness or sexuality became an important thing for people in general to pay 
attention to. Madness or sexuality, he argued, were ideas that society began to use to exercise 
discursive power. His theory of power demonstrates how so-called peculiar behavior became 
madness and sexuality, and how madness and sexuality as discourse began to be used to mold 
behavior. 
An important conclusion to draw from Foucault’s work is that all these objects, 
authorities, and concepts are discursive. At some point, madness or sexuality, for example, 
separate themselves from the behaviors they are presumed to represent. They became madness 
and sexuality in the minds and imaginations of people. In this way, they became something 
else; that is, a separation occurred, and the thing (behavior) exists as separate from the words 
used to imagine it (madness or sexuality). 
To continue with the example of madness, it is not the case that the family, through 
human comparison of what is normal and what is not, established that a person was mad and 
then handed the person off to the psychiatrist, who had also seen separate instances of what 
was obviously madness and had studied it. Nor was it the case that the judicial system 
identified behind a murder the psychopathology of ‘paranoia’ or behind a sexual offense the 
psychopathology of ‘neurosis.’ That is, the way that madness and sexuality are understood is 
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not simply a product of the relationships that individual people make between, for example, 
madness and criminality as two logically connected things.  
Instead, particular expressions of neurosis or paranoia were labelled as madness because 
of the relationships medicine and the judiciary, for example, had with each other, and with 
‘madness’ as a discourse (separate and apart from the behaviors it supposedly merely 
described).  
In contrast to Foucault, this dissertation is not focused on identifying the set of rules that 
define Srebrenica as a discourse or how Srebrenica as a discourse is used to mold behavior.3 
Instead, this dissertation asserts that multiple discourses of Srebrenica exist. It focuses on people 
who have two very different discourses or images or perspectives of Srebrenica, how they try to 
influence each other’s images of the city, and whether and when they are ever successful at 
doing so. In Foucault’s terms, this dissertation examines discursive power and resistance to it to 
identify what strategies are successful in resisting power, and what contextual factors seem to 
be important to that successful resistance.  
I start by asserting that, in the same way that madness emerged as a discourse based on 
the reality of what otherwise would have been unsystematically understood as ‘peculiar’ 
behaviors, discourse has also emerged around the reality of the city of Srebrenica. More 
specifically, two distinct discourses have emerged around Srebrenica as a remote city in a 
 
3 I would argue that Srebrenica as a discourse does mold the behavior of both international visitors to the 
city and local residents.  
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remote region of the former Yugoslavia—one based on the perspective of a specific group of 
local residents, and the other based on the perspective of international visitors to the city.4 
Because of the international attention the city of Srebrenica maintains given the events 
that occurred there in the 1990s, these local residents and international visitors interact with 
each other quite often. When they do so, an opportunity arises to study discursive power and 
resistance to it. The remainder of this dissertation does just that, using Foucault’s methodology 
as a guide. In particular, I compare and contrast the objects, authorities, and concepts that 
represent the images that both local residents of and international visitors to the city have of 
Srebrenica. Then I look at the strategies each group uses to influence the other when there is a 
contentious difference in those images. By doing so, I come to conclusions about discursive 
power, resistance, and the strategies that seem to be effective in influencing others.  
The literature on power inspired from Foucault’s work has led to another field of study 
focused on resistance. Taking a cue from Foucault, the trick to understanding power is to find 
resistance to it. By examining that resistance, one would be able to identify and understand 
better the power that invited it.  
There are two problems with this approach. First, resistance is understood as a product 
of the power that produced it. The assumption is that there is a hegemonic system of power that 
creates all the subjects within it; if that is true, power is flawed and the very motivation for 
studying resistance is negated.  
 
4 Important to note, not all international visitors bring with them the exact same image of Srebrenica. It is 
also the case that many local residents have different discourses of Srebrenica. Sometimes, international 
visitors and local residents even share the same discourse. The qualitative analyses here and throughout 
compile themes identified from my ethnographic immersion and from the interview data I collected and 
are representative of the local residents and international visitors included in the study. 
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Second, the focus on studying resistance has lead researchers and theorists to forget to 
study the power that invited it in the first place (Abu-Lughod, 1990). In studies of resistance, 
increasingly less time is spent focused on understanding power (Abu-Lughod, 1990:41-42). 
There is a tendency to “read all forms of resistance as signs of the ineffectiveness of systems of 
power and of the resilience and creativity of the human spirit in its refusal to be dominated.” 
That focus has left the original question of power yet unexplained.  
Abu-Lughod (1990) encourages a move away from “abstract theories of power toward 
methodological strategies for the study of power in particular situations.” But she noticed that a 
lot of research was presupposing hierarchies of power. More than twenty years later, Bloom 
(2013: 220) documents the same trend: researchers place people into the category of powerless 
and powerful, which “neglects the heterogeneity and complexity of an individual’s social 
position.” And he cites Hollander and Einwohner (2004:550), who leveled a similar observation 
and challenge nearly ten years earlier: “dichotomizing resisters and dominators in this way 
ignores the fact that there are multiple systems of hierarchy, and that individuals can be 
simultaneously powerful and powerless within different systems.” 
In this study, rather than position local residents or international visitors as powerless or 
powerful, I position them as equals. The methodological contribution this dissertation makes to 
the study of power is that I begin by describing the markers of the discourse each of these 
groups has of Srebrenica. I use as a guide Foucault’s methodology in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. In his terms, I carefully describe the objects, concepts, and authorities that are 
relevant to both the visitors and the residents. By doing so, I demonstrate a path for a study of 
power and discourse that exposes its components, enabling analysis of the strategies for 
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influencing discourse and power, without entrapping the study in impossible debates about 
what resistance is and who can do it. 
 Methodology 
Ethnography: This study began originally in July of 2012 as I embarked on my field 
research for my Master’s thesis. The data I collected in July, August, and December 2012 also 
influences the new data I present here.  I gathered field notes during the summer and December 
and conducted interviews during the last several weeks of August 2012.  
For the dissertation field work, I was in Srebrenica from May of 2014 to February of 
2015, March of 2015 to June of 2015, October of 2015 to February of 2017, and March of 2017 to 
July of 2018, totaling nearly four full years. During that time, a few biographically important 
events took place. I was employed full-time at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of 
East Sarajevo from October 2015 to July 2018 as Lecturer. I also became pregnant with our first 
child, Ognjen, and carried the first half of the pregnancy in Bosnia. I returned to the U.S. in June 
of 2015 to give birth, and our family returned to Srebrenica in October 2015, when I began to 
work full time at the University. The following year, I was pregnant with our second child, a 
difficult pregnancy that was carried to an easy birth, in Bosnia.  
These biographical events influence the cadence of data collection for this research. 
While constantly learning what life in Srebrenica is like today for the duration of my time there, 
and having exposure to and living in the culture, the interview and participant observation data 
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collection was largely conducted when possible given the constraints of pregnancy, travel, 
motherhood, and full-time employment. The bulk of my data collection occurred in Winter, 
Spring, and Summer 2016 – 2017, though there were periods before that when I did conduct 
interviews and participant observations.  
Important to note is that the ethnography and interviews with local residents were 
mostly conducted in the local language, but also in English when the local resident wanted to or 
the circumstances of the participant observations demanded English language use. Having 
taken two years of university study of the local language and my time in the field, I am fully 
fluent in the local language, and in practice assessments score what corresponds to a 3/+ on the 
ILR for Bosnian/Serbian. All of the interviews and participant observations conducted with 
international visitors to Srebrenica were completed in English. There were times when we 
consulted Google translate to help make sense of words unfamiliar to interviewees who speak a 
first language other than English.   
The ethnographies focused firstly on understanding patterns in the use of the ethnic 
identity markers by local residents, including Musliman/Bosnjak (Mulsim/Bosniak or Bosnian 
Muslim), Srbin (“Serb”) and Bosanac (“Bosnian”). The second was understanding patterns in the 
use of other identity markers by local residents, including stranac/stranci (“foreigner(s)”, 
“outsider(s)”), nasi (“ours”), seljak (“villager/redneck”), bogati (“rich”), politicar (“politicians”), 
kulturan (“well-mannered,” “refined”), and posteni ljudi (“good/moral people”). The third was a 
focus on situations in which I, as an outsider who does not have the local social capital to 
understand fully the meaning and use of ethnic identity markers, expected ethnic identity to be 
important and it was not, or did not expect it to be important and it actually was.  
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The second important focus of the ethnography was to gain access to local 
understanding when international visitors (other than me) are not present. Avoidance of 
international visitors is one strategy local residents use in order to avoid the sometimes 
unpleasant consequences that result from those interactions. The ethnography, to the extent that 
I earned the trust and acceptance of local residents, lent insight into these perspectives as well.  
Often, I voice recorded and then transcribed the data I had from the ethnography. I 
suffered data loss during my time in the field and have since reconstructed some of these events 
from memory. The reconstruction of those events served as a source for confirming, disputing, 
and refining my understanding of ethnic identity as it is used by local residents, as well as for 
limiting the statements that I can confidently make about what ethnic identity means to local 
individuals; there remain instances where I cannot understand why ethnic identity markers 
were used in interactions. The events that form the corpus of my data are only partial to the 
knowledge I’ve gained from the experience itself. The more informative source is the totality of 
what I understand given my immersion in the city. 
Living in Srebrenica during the nearly four years I was there provided opportunities 
and access to a wide range of situations that serve to inform my robust understanding of life in 
Srebrenica. These included the more social aspects of life. I was present for private family 
events and celebrations in a mostly Serbian space. I was also present for holidays and events 
that took place in the city beyond the religious/family lines, including graduations, New Year’s 
celebrations, May Day celebrations, celebrations of the very young people in the city, and the 
yearly “Days of Srebrenica” events sponsored by the city and its inhabitants. Participation in the 
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daily community aspects of life in the part of the town where our condominium is located was 
also an essential source of learning for the ethnography.  
My experience also included more professional opportunities. I worked with many local 
non-profit organizations in collaboration on a variety of projects. This included project 
implementation as well as project planning and proposal writing. In addition, I was employed 
at the University of East Sarajevo. The University is located in Pale, about two hours’ drive from 
Srebrenica, so the ethnographic value added was partially in contrast to Srebrenica, but also 
provided insight into the culture of the academy and how it relates to other institutions, e.g., the 
church, politics, and civil society. This was an important perspective, especially as it relates to 
the literature on the former Yugoslavia and the characterization of academics and their 
influence on the war itself. Additionally, it provided exposure to a wealth of young people 
enrolled in the English and Chinese Language and Literature program. In addition to this direct 
professional involvement in society, I also partnered with my husband in the day-to-day and 
financial operations of his café, which lent considerable insight into the complex overlap 
between private and public life, especially in an ethno-feudal context.  
My interactions with local government were of three qualities. While my presence in the 
local government building was marginal, I had a few opportunities to see inside its workings in 
the overlap between the local non-profit organizations and their cooperation with the local 
municipality. The second was the experience I had with local and national government, as an 
alien resident. This included our marriage, registering myself and otherwise complying with 
legal requirements for non-citizens from the U.S. residing in country for longer than 90 days, 
interactions with local police and the judicial system during barricaded traffic stops, as well as 
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the follow-up to an incident in which a drunk driver collided with our car head on. I was 
interviewed by police, examined by medical institutions, and notified of court events by the 
judicial institution. 
I also gave birth to one son in country, but in the Federation, so that I was able to gain 
understanding of the complexity of the bureaucratic apparatus that connects and thereby 
separates the two entities. My experience also included working with the U.S. embassy for 
paperwork for our children, my husband, and for me. Finally, I experienced local government 
from the perspective of business owner, subject to taxes, regulations, and inspections.  
We also relied upon local social services and I was able to gain experience into the 
consequences of a sometimes more and sometimes less developed social welfare system. For 
example, the lack of emergency services became apparent in two situations—the car accident 
we experienced and an incident involving the detonation of a bomb in the night in the café on 
the entry floor of the apartment building in which we were sleeping. In contrast to these less 
developed social welfare systems, there were others more developed. Because I was employed 
full-time as a lecturer at the university, I was afforded a full year of maternity leave at 100% of 
my pay. We also used the daycare in Srebrenica for childcare for our elder son, a subsidized 
service. In addition, following the car accident, which was caused by a drunk driver who had 
no insurance, we were partially compensated for our losses by a social fund made available for 
exactly these situations.  
I also had experience in the medical system in Srebrenica, from both a bureaucratic 
perspective and the perspective of a patient. On the first, I saw first-hand the way the 
government and the medical system overlap through the medical and psychological 
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examinations I underwent in order to gain legal status as a resident alien, and to gain a permit 
to work. I also experienced the relationship between the judiciary and the hospital when my 
blood was drawn to determine my blood alcohol level after we were hit by a drunk driver. 
As a patient, as I mentioned, I gave birth to one son in the country, and was pregnant 
twice. In addition, I spent time in two hospitals for treatment of a kidney stone. I also likely 
suffered a broken rib from the car accident, which was treated in one hospital. In addition, I had 
routine check-ups and illness checks as necessary, as well as exposure to the private medical 
system when the public system couldn’t accommodate our needs. This happened more often 
than not. 
I also had financial experience in Srebrenica, understanding what it takes to own 
property, how one operates a bank account, how loans work, and how money is exchanged 
outside the banking and financial system, on a personal level. 
My personal interaction with local religious organizations was nearly non-existent. I had 
no access whatsoever to the local mosque and my interactions with the local church were 
mediated through my husband, and his interactions were already quite limited. My exposure to 
the church was mostly through stories told by others, notices in the community, and through 
following the local news.  
Taken together, my experiences in Srebrenica were quite robust to gain an 
understanding into life in Srebrenica today and how local people make sense of it. While I have 
recorded the particular instances I outline above, most of the ethnographic knowledge I have is 
not in written form, but rather in experiential form. My understanding and knowledge of local 
life and many different local perspectives informs the way I understand both the interviews 
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with local residents as well as with international visitors. It also informs the analysis of events I 
report in this paper. It is important to note, however, that I am not native to Srebrenica and 
cannot claim expertise on that perspective. I can give a close approximation, but nothing more. 
The experiences I have are extremely unique and they influence the interpretation of my 
own data and the way I interpret the research coming from others from the region, so I want to 
provide a bit more of the ethnographic anecdotes here to help readers contextualize my analysis 
and interpretation of the data. Not unusual to ethnographic research in so-called ‘divided 
societies,’ I was more exposed in the long-run to the Serbian community in Srebrenica. But it 
wasn’t always that way. 
I first came to Srebrenica through a Summer University sponsored in part through the 
Potocari Memorial Center that had advertised its programming on a list serve on which a 
professor was a recipient. She forwarded the email to me and I, who had been researching an 
entirely different potential research site, but was in need of field research to complete my 
master’s thesis, applied. Three weeks later, I was in Sarajevo, embarking on a two-month 
research journey.  
This initial entry into the city was through the Potocari Memorial Center, and therefore, 
exposed me initially more to the Muslim community in Srebrenica. From a local perspective, in 
many ways, I was marked as ‘Muslim,’ not in religious practice of course, but by association, 
though the reality of that marking was not at all clear to me until much later. That experience 
was marked by near daily visits to the Memorial Center, staying in a hostel with a Muslim 
woman (who became a dear friend and our kuma), walking the Mars Mira, and being invited to 
and attending several iftars. During that time, importantly, I had experiences and contact with 
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local Serbian youth, for example day trips to a local lake, but no invitations for in home meals or 
family celebrations, for example. 
When it became publicly known about year after my entry into the very small town that 
my husband and I were in a relationship, at the time not yet married and he a man who was of 
fighting age at the time of the war, I quickly became aware of how ‘marked’ I had become as a 
member of the Muslim community. There were some in that group who explicitly offered their 
support to me, giving their reasoning: “Dobar je covjek,” referring to my husband. (“He is a good 
man.”) Others, those I later found out did not know my husband, asked around about him—
where was he during the war? What had he done? Mutual friends reported to me that others 
had asked them how I could have betrayed them. Of course, that was reported to me, so I could 
not verify that, though de-friending on Facebook would suggest to me this was at least 
consistent with the sentiment. Finally, from not a few of these individuals, I felt immense 
pressure to vocalize my opinion about the genocide, despite having developed the intimate 
relationships with some of those survivors, despite having walked with them during the Mars 
Mira.  
Over time, I was able to reestablish friendly acquaintanceships with these individuals, 
able to meet for a coffee and catch up about family and children, school and work. And I have 
always maintained an empathetic analytic understanding of the situation from their 
perspective. Given a vacuum of mere knowledge about the past, let alone acknowledgement of 
the truth, and recognition of atrocity, among other things, I can imagine having similar feelings 
and reacting similarly. 
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Once married, I had become “Serbian,” and this time I was more fully aware of the fact 
that I was being read this way from a local perspective. To take an example, the attendees at the 
local municipal building at our wedding ceremony cheered when I agreed to take my 
husband’s last name.5 In the same way that I was asked previously to vocally express my 
opinion about genocide, and therefore my loyalty to the Muslim community, I was also tested 
by some in the Serbian community. For example, on a few occasions, I was asked what 
language I was speaking. Smartly, I would answer, “Vas!” (“Yours!”) Invariably, the question is 
asked by someone trying to make a point, who would follow-up, “Koji?” (“Which one is that?”), 
pushing me to say whether it was Bosnian or Serbian. Also invariably, one or two others 
present would jump in, “Pusti je, ba!” (“Leave her alone!”) 
It was also the case that because I was married to a Serbian man and because I was in 
field for so long and built relationships with so many local residents, many felt comfortable 
speaking to me freely about their thoughts, feelings, and opinions about local and international 
politics. I heard a wide range of them. I met those who long for Tito’s brotherhood and unity. I 
met those who want a separate but equal lifestyle. I met those who want revenge. I met 
genocide deniers. I met those who acknowledge the atrocities against Muslims in 1995. I met 
those who don’t want to talk about Muslim victims, but who lost their own grandfathers, 
mothers, fathers, cousins, or sisters. I met those who will call what happened in 1995 to the 
 
5 I remember feeling surprised when they cheered. I wondered if I had misunderstood the official’s 
question, spoken in the local language! My maiden name is from my biological father with whom I have 
no meaningful connection, so for me the decision, as a woman in our modern world, was to 1) share a 
name with the love of my life and my future children, 2) keep a name that is meaningless, or 3) create a 
different name that is meaningless to everyone. I’m still confused as to why everyone cheered that day, 
but I feel mostly sure that no one was cheering with me that day.  
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Muslim community genocide. And I met those who don’t want to call it genocide simply 
because the number of those murdered doesn’t compare to the Holocaust.  
Right or wrong, the opinions are vastly different within the Serbian population in 
Srebrenica. This ethnographic experience, the contextualization my unique experience offers 
becomes important in understanding the interpretation and the conclusions I am trying to make 
later in this dissertation, one of the most important of which is that there is very little consistent 
substance under the label “the Serbs” as far as political opinions go in Srebrenica.  
Interviews: During the 2012 field work, I completed 14 interviews with local residents 
from a variety of backgrounds. Some interviews were conducted in English with local residents 
who speak English as a second language. A translator was present for the other interviews. At 
the time of this initial study, I did not speak the local language.  
The dissertation field work includes single interviews from 29 local residents and two 
interviews each with most of the 34 international visitors who participated in the research. The 
interview length ranged from as few as six minutes to as long as one two-hour long interview. It 
also includes 26 participant observations. Participants in the study were selected first by 
introduction to international visitors in the city. Sometimes this was a product of 
happenstance—I would meet visitors while in a café or elsewhere in the city. Other times, I 
became aware of the visitors to the city through interactions with local residents.  
I asked the international visitors if they would be willing to conduct a few interviews 
with me and for me to conduct participant observations of their interactions with local 
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residents. Upon gaining their consent, I conducted the first interview.6 With some international 
visitors, I was able to conduct the initial interview very early in their visit to Srebrenica. With 
others, especially those who had been to Srebrenica before or who had spent a lot of time in the 
city already, the interviews were surely influenced by experiences they’d already had. This 
manifests itself in the data, as noted in later chapters. 
The participant observations lasted anywhere from short, hour-long observations to 
days-long participation in programs brought to the city by international visitors. During these 
observations, I looked for moments when international visitors and local residents seemed to 
struggle over meaning. While the participant observations yielded a few valuable pieces of data 
for analysis, as a general source for data analysis, its use was limited. Logistically speaking, it 
was not plausible to follow the international visitors for all or even most of their time in the city, 
and so I often heard about interesting discussions or conversations from the interviews because 
they had occurred at times when I wasn’t present. Their value added to the data analysis is 
limited. The second interview with international visitors occurred as soon after the participant 
observation as was possible, and this was largely dependent on when the international visitor 
could manage to find time. Some of the second interviews with international visitors occurred 
over Skype, but most of them were in person in the city.  
As with the ethnography, I want to provide a bit more detail here to contextualize my 
experience with international visitors. I was in a very unique position in Srebrenica, and of 
course many international visitors understood that. I was myself an international visitor, and 
 
6 See appendix for the questionnaire that guided these interviews. 
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other visitors immediately recognized that. I was able to help them navigate the local situation, 
connect them to resources (such as where to secure housing and food, or connect them with 
translators), or get them directions.  
Through the interviews and the participant observations, I did develop relationships 
and friendships with many of the international visitors to Srebrenica, though not all of them. On 
many occasions, they began to confide in me, seeing me as a safe space to ask questions that 
they otherwise did not feel comfortable asking local residents, or asking for clarification when 
they felt confused or needed direction. I avoided answering questions related to my research 
until after I had completed my second interview with them. 
Aside from the questions they asked me directly, I often found myself in uncomfortable 
situations, either because I vehemently disagreed with the international visitors approach or 
ethics, or because I was the recipient of the ire of local residents who had felt disrespected or 
slighted by some or another visitor. More often than not, I felt compelled to apologize.  
On the questions I received, I often heard questions about whether things were really 
peaceful in Srebrenica. There were questions about whether Serbs and Muslims could really get 
along and be peaceful with one another, and how that could really be possible when tensions 
were so high and the past so unresolved. I was often asked about the ethnicity of local residents 
and how one could tell the difference. But other questions were just innocuous, about the 
damage from the war and why houses were still vacant and unrenovated twenty years later.  
On the ire I heard, this ranged widely. Some local residents simply do not want to talk 
about the war. Occasionally it happens that all the strategies they have developed to avoid 
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international visitors and the war questions that come with them fail. These are usually dark 
moments. In my experience, the Serbian youth are most associated with this posture.  
This is a generation barely old enough to lucidly remember the war itself, but know their 
lives without a mother or father, uncle or grandmother. They are also old enough to remember 
a life of international visitors blaming “Serbs,” a name they claim but a blame they cannot. And 
while they do have empathy for their Muslim counterparts who have grown up in similar 
situations, missing fathers and grandfathers, uncles and cousins, or with mothers, aunts and 
cousins victimized during and after the war, they struggle to understand why their losses have 
not been recognized. They have learned not to seek recognition anymore because the denial of it 
is simply too painful and enraging to bear. 
Other local residents however continue to seek recognition, and they do it by engaging 
with international visitors. Some of their stories are included here—Stefan, for example, though 
there are many others. On many occasions, I listened to them as the international visitors left 
them. I listened to them recount stories from months or, in two cases, years earlier.  
Others would be upset at the seeming idiocy of some of the questions asked. One local 
resident annoyed with one international visitor confided to me his disbelief that an 
international visitor had asked him why so many houses were vacant and unfinished. “Because 
they are dead! How could she ask me that?”  
On the other hand, it is also important to note that there were a handful of international 
visitors to the city that seemed to be fully welcomed and accepted into the local community. 
These were usually individuals who had longer-standing relationships with the community, 
had been back and forth to Srebrenica on many occasions or had lived there for sustained 
25 
periods of time, learned at least a little bit of the language, and the local residents spoke of them 
as “nase” (“ours”).  
On my own relationships with international visitors, as mentioned they often looked to 
me for assistance and as a participant observer I obliged where the assistance wouldn’t interfere 
with the research. For example, if they needed information about housing or food, I would 
provide recommendations or connect them with phone numbers or escort them to a hostel or 
restaurant. In other situations, they might ask me what Serbs or Muslims think about such and 
such or whether one location or another was a Serbian or Muslim place.  I would note the 
question for my own records but avoid answering it.  
Often, the second interview with the international visitors would trigger a kind of 
reflection for them and open up a conversation that would inspire in them questions to ask me. 
After we had finished those questions, sometimes those conversations would continue and I 
would talk more freely with the international visitors about my own opinions and experiences, 
but always framing them as my own, not quite fully international, but not fully local either.  
The second interview with local residents occurred as soon after the participant 
observation as possible, with at least one of the local resident interviews occurring weeks after 
the observation because the observation happened on July 10th. Out of respect for the family’s 
participation in a burial of the remains of a loved one, I waited for an appropriate time to 
conduct the interview. I also used the observations to orient myself to the post-observation 
interviews with both international visitors and local residents. 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) recommend data analysis begins with data collection, 
and that it continues with transcription, reading, and coding the data. I followed their 
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methodology, writing memos about the data as I was collecting, transcribing, reading, and 
coding it. During this process, I identified events that were important (attempts at influencing 
others, e.g.) and themes across visitor and residents interactions that seemed to be important 
(friendship, e.g.). I coded these during the several reading and coding passes I took with the 
data.  
I approached the data analysis first by reading through the transcripts of the interviews, 
while recalling the interactions I witnessed and the interviews with others I had documented. 
While reading, I marked all instances where it seemed that international visitors and local 
residents struggled to convey meaning one to the other. These were usually marked by either 
outright disagreement or by negotiating back and forth, clarifying, and coming to either 
resolution, an agreement in difference of opinion, or abandonment of the topic by one or all 
individuals involved. During this analysis, I identified about 80 instances of this type of 
engagement reported to me by the interviewees or recognized by me in the analysis of the 
entire corpus, including the other interviews and the participant observations. 
Of these 80, I focused the analysis on those instances that were related to negotiating the 
meaning of Srebrenica and what it signifies today to the international visitors and the local 
residents. In doing so, I reduced the number of events to a manageable size, and identified 
instances of local residents asserting their understanding of what Srebrenica and life in it is like 
to international visitors as well as instances of international visitors asserting their 
understanding of Srebrenica and life in it to local residents. Within these, I identified both 
instances of success at influencing the other, as well as instances of failure.  
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I defined success as recognition of a changed perspective by the person who was the 
object of attempts at influence—either international visitor or local resident. In reading through 
the interviews in the context of the entire corpus of data, including the other interviews, the 
participant observations, and what I learned through the ethnographic study, I also derived 
some themes that seemed important in shaping the ability of international visitors and local 
residents to influence the other.  
As for the manner in which I present the interview excerpts and observations as well as 
the ethnography, I had to take care to represent the local and visitor perspectives in the most 
neutral way possible, while also preserving the anonymity of the participants involved. Those 
two principles most influenced my decisions regarding editing the stories and interview 
excerpts, as well as decisions about what to include and exclude.  
What follows is a "good enough" ethnography, one that accounts for the practices of a 
diverse group of individuals in Srebrenica (Bourgois 2009:15). As noted, I cannot claim to speak 
for people of Srebrenica, though for shorthand I refer to the group of individuals I interviewed 
and observed as 'local residents.' Nor can I claim to speak for all international visitors. Some of 
their experiences were similar to mine and others very different.  
I have edited the interview excerpts for readability, mostly focusing on phrasing from 
English as a second language interviews to be more clear to the apparent intended meaning of 
the interviewee. Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland (2006:98) advise obscuring and 
disguising data to protect individuals’ identities. In conversation with local residents and with 
international visitors, I have confirmed my understanding of some of the sentiments they 
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report, and they have in that way confirmed what I have written. However, I have not sent this 
text to any participants to verify my understanding.  
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2.0 Chapter 2: The ‘Object’ of Srebrenica 
I am arguing throughout this work two separate discourses have emerged that are 
separate from the reality of Srebrenica as a city today. In order to understand how local 
residents and international visitors try to influence each other when their images of Srebrenica 
differ, I use Foucault’s objects, authorities, and concepts as a framework for first comparing and 
contrasting the two images. This chapter focuses on how, when, and where Srebrenica emerges 
as an object. First, I look from the perspective of a specific set of local individuals, then from the 
perspective of the international discourse around Srebrenica. Then I compare and contrast these 
perspectives, using ethnographic, interview, and participant observation data to provide 
qualitative examples. 
 The Local Residents’ Object 
Srebrenica for the local residents included in this study7 first emerges as an object of 
attention in the local political situation over which there is still great controversy. Srebrenica 
was infamously handed to the Serbian Republic at the end of the war, a war that ended a very 
7 Discursively, Srebrenica has multiple local iterations, including those produced by local political, 
religious, and cultural groups. In this work, I focus on Srebrenica as understood by a specific set of local 
residents, a group of mostly unaffiliated, marginalized, underemployed or unemployed citizens of both 
Muslim and Orthodox backgrounds. As a group, they share for the most part a cosmopolitanism, 
skepticism of politics, struggle with the economy, and love for the city itself. 
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long pre-war period of a thriving economy, a healthy tourism industry, a city full of life and 
people, and good relationships under Tito’s brotherhood and unity strategy for cohesion in the 
former Yugoslavia. Muslim and Orthodox more than occasionally intermarried, were friends, 
and went to the same schools. People had jobs and prospects and hope for the future. Ethnic 
identity was, by all of the accounts I’ve learned, an important sense making device for daily life, 
and for the most part fluid in its uses and salience. 
At the end of the war, Srebrenica was designated to the Serbian Republic’s territory 
within the newly formed country of Bosnia. Reeling from the end of the war, tensions and fear 
remaining critically high, and newly formed political arrangements yet to be fully understood 
in practice, the Serbian Republic made efforts to forcibly migrate ethnic Serbs living in the 
Federation (the territory parceled to the Catholic/Croatian and Bosnjak/Muslim groups), to 
parts of the Serbian Republic. Srebrenica was a region where quite a lot of ethnic Serbs were 
asked, and sometimes forced, to relocate after the war.  
As the truth about massacres and the genocide against the Muslim population began to 
emerge, and military and political leaders were beginning trials for war crimes, the gravity of 
the atrocities in Srebrenica, which happened under the watchful eye of the UN troops, created 
momentum behind the voices of a set of Muslims seeking mere information (not to even 
mention justice) about what had happened to their loved ones. Srebrenica’s status as a city 
under the Serbian Republic came to many to be unbearable. But with no Muslims living in the 
city, with the personal threat to some of those Serbs who fought during the war of trial for war 
crimes, and a lot of misinformation, the progress the Muslim community was making in gaining 
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recognition for what happened, gaining information on the status and location of their loved 
ones, and gaining rights to return to their homes was hard won and extremely slowly realized.  
As such, Srebrenica became a powerful discourse available for use by many groups—
victims groups on both sides, political parties, and by international organizations and actors. 
Thus, Srebrenica emerges as an object as politicians and others use its image as a political tool 
that these local residents believe stifles its future. The image directly influences the daily lives of 
these local residents and their future is profoundly dependent upon it. Therefore, they have a 
very real stake in what image of Srebrenica dominates discursively. 
Who brings Srebrenica into focus as an object that demands their attention? For these 
local residents, this includes the political class in Srebrenica and in Bosnia, and most of this 
group of local residents suspect political motives behind anyone who employs Srebrenica as a 
tool in the media. This even includes groups who are still seeking identification of the remains 
of their loved ones, who are also drawing attention to Srebrenica. In addition, international and 
local media, the ICTY, and the myriad international visitors that come to the city every year also 
do so. They ensure Srebrenica is an object of attention and try to designate its meaning, which 
maintains Srebrenica as an object of attention and contention for these local residents. Their 
futures literally depend on it. 
The context in which Srebrenica emerges as an object of attention described above and 
the list of actors who bring Srebrenica into focus give meaning to the various ways that local 
residents categorize and structure their knowledge about Srebrenica: through demographics of 
people and the relationships people have with each other. 
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Local residents prioritize certain demographic splits of the city when they assert their 
knowledge of the city and evaluate others’ images of it. Given the disdain these local residents 
have for the political use of the image of Srebrenica, and the consequences that use has for the 
present and future of those residents, it’s unsurprising that they prioritize knowledge about 
whether individuals are politicians (politcari) and whether they are rich (bogati). They also think 
about who really lives in Srebrenica versus those who only work there and then leave. They 
also consider whether they are good or bad (posteni ljudi), and if they are from the city or the 
village (seljak). Ethnicity is obviously a major aspect as well, as it is really a profound aspect of 
life for most local residents. So the markers of Muslim or Orthodox inform their understanding 
in mostly neutral ways; however, how individuals relate to their own and the other’s 
community is also important to know (cetnik or mudzahedin, e.g.).  
Another way of structuring their knowledge about and image of the city is by 
understanding relationships between people, which is typically marked by its ethno-feudal 
character. When asserting their knowledge about and image of Srebrenica, these local residents 
are focusing on the connections (veze) between people in the city—financial, ethnic, family, and 
social. This detailed, hyper-local and hyper-historical social capital can explain even the oddest 
of occurrences to local residents. Important to emphasize here is the level of complexity that 
shapes their discourse of Srebrenica.  
In sum, for local residents, Srebrenica emerges as a discursive object when Srebrenica 
became an object of political attention, the beginning of the war, and the political and rhetorical 
battle that has been fought for the past twenty-five years. These residents give that discourse on 
Srebrenica attention because their futures depend on it. They are deeply interested in producing 
33 
a balanced, cosmopolitan, empathetic image of Srebrenica that cannot any longer be used to 
perpetuate a stagnate, corrupt, and hopeless present. In that context, demographics of local 
actors and hyper-local relationships become the framework these individuals use to generate 
knowledge about the discursive image of Srebrenica they hold. 
 The International Visitors’ Object 
I argue that multiple discourses around Srebrenica have emerged. Here I focus on how 
Srebrenica emerged as an object for international visitors, who has called so much attention to 
it, and what structure they give to the knowledge they have of Srebrenica.  At the global level, 
in defining where and when ‘Srebrenica’ could have become an object, the first and probably 
most obvious is that of a globalizing world, in which a small town in a remote region of Europe 
could become internationally recognizable. Part and parcel to that notion of a globalizing world 
is the political foundation of it—the nation state. But just as the family, social groups, and work 
situations were present for ages before the emergence of madness as an object, so have 
globalization and nation states existed long before Srebrenica became the focus of attention.  
What was unique at the time of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia when attention on 
Srebrenica emerged? The “post-Cold War world” had snatched away the more comfortable 
terms that had previously made conflicts understandable (e.g., capitalism vs. communism, or 
East vs. West). With the end of the Cold War, and its use as a sense making framework for 
armed conflict, the world was met with the unusually quick resolution of the Gulf War in 1991. 
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Reeling forward with the U.S.-led military intervention in Somalia, and recoiling given its 
disastrous consequences, the world in a few short years saw the ravages of what seemed like a 
new kind of conflict there, and in Rwanda, Cambodia, Iraq, and in the former Yugoslavia.  
Theories to explain these conflicts had to grapple with their stickiness: they seemed not 
to end, were of a different kind, fought under different rules, and aimed at seemingly different 
goals. But not long after the end of that decade, the reaction to the attacks on September 11, 
2001, gave the world a new, more global and more tenacious framework for thinking about 
(and directing attention towards) a new kind of conflict moving forward: wars of terror, 
extremist-led wars, wars of religion. That new framework tightly contained the academic and 
practitioner assignment for interrogating the conflicts that occurred between the bookends of 
the Cold War at the end of the 1980s, and the War on Terror at the beginning of the 2000s, 
conflicts that marked the 1990s and became known as ‘ethnic wars.’8 
In the context of the end of the Cold War, and before the emergence of the war on terror 
and conflicts that followed it, these conflicts emerged as a problem uninterpretable to the 
modern global world or to the institutions that were available and which had authority to talk 
about them. Drawing on analyses from experts, limited by resources of government, contingent 
upon a yet to be defined framework for thinking about them employed by politicians and 
policy makers, sensitive to the reports and focus of the international media, and beholden in 
part by the atrocious images coming from these conflicts, a general context in which one could 
 
8 The argument I am making here is broadly applicable to the international scene in the 1990s and 2000s, 
but Woodward (1996) and Burg & Shoup (1999), to name a few, demonstrate it happening in the former 
Yugoslavia.  
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understand the conflicts of the 1990s emerged: ethnic war. That understanding largely informs 
the image many international visitors bring with them to the city. 
Who directed attention to these wars, and specifically to Srebrenica? This new form of 
conflict was brought to the forefront by a variety of international non-governmental 
organizations, international governmental organizations, non-profit and human rights 
organizations, the military, and the media. The media in this instance was particularly 
instrumental in defining the discourse around these conflicts, as the ravage, despair, and 
suffering propelled intervention as a topic to the global conversation at the same time the 
relatively new phenomenon of 24-hour news coverage on cable television amplified it.  
The United Nations also played an essential role in defining and designating the 
attention that was paid to these conflicts, as well as directing partially which conflicts would 
receive attention and which would not. NATO also became an important actor, especially 
related to the conflicts that emerged in the former Yugoslavia, and the attention they gave was 
gravely influenced by dramatic U.S. soldier losses also amplified by a non-stop news cycle. 
Human Rights Watch as an INGO was instrumental in drumming up attention to these wars as 
well as the momentum for international intervention.  
What framework for knowledge do they use to understand this discourse around 
Srebrenica? The conflicts in the 1990s were dissected and explaining using a variety economic, 
political, social, psychological, ideological, and developmental aspects of the locations in which 
they occurred.9 While ethnic hatred was typically understood as a causal mechanism, at least in 
 
9 See, for examples, Brown (2001), Collier et al (2007), Commission on Human Security (2007), Kiernan 
(2007), Krasner and Pascual (2005), Langer (2005), Large and Sisk (2006), Mann (2005), Mueller (2005), 
Snyder (2000), Stein (2001), and van Arsdale (2009). 
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the popular mind, more complex analyses compared and contrasted these conflicts along many 
of these lines. Most commonly, the economic poverty of the location was emphasized, a lack of 
democratic political institutions cited, extremist ideology asserted, and general social 
development—understood as related to, dependent upon, but different from the combination of 
economic and political conditions—implied.  
Even so, ethnic identity, conceived as a powerful human construct, was usually not far 
from the explanations offered. In the context of poverty, undemocratic political systems, 
‘backwards’ social systems, and/or extremist ideology, the thinking went, one can understand 
the power ethnic identity holds over a population. Fix those and ethnic identity will no longer 
be a cause of war. 
Specifically from the perspective of the international visitors coming into Srebrenica in 
the mid- to late-2010s, the context in which Srebrenica emerges is primarily marked by its 
position as recipient of global aid or charity, and secondly by Srebrenica’s memorial services in 
July of each year. On the former, it was not unusual that international visitors I interviewed 
cited that it was their desire to help local residents that brought them to the city in the first 
place.  To take only a few examples, one long-time visitor to the city is not only motivated by 
being useful to local residents, but also is passionately critical of other international visitors who 
come to the city in July each year. The metric by which the value of an international visitor can 
be judged, according to this visitor, is the extent to which one can be useful.  
Another long-time visitor reported that the organization that originally brought him to 
Srebrenica was motivated to help the children of different ethnic backgrounds come together to 
work on ethnic relations, and to receive therapy for trauma. One more example was a young 
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woman from Eastern Europe who demonstrated clearly that her purpose was to help local 
residents through art and culture better understand the world and themselves, to know 
different and more points of view. She was in the position of being able to help the local 
residents, and it was clear that the transmission of knowledge could only be from her to them, 
and not the other way around. 
A condition of the emergence of Srebrenica as a recipient of aid is related to its position 
as ‘developing’ or ‘non-western.’ This categorization of the city in those terms was also evident 
in the way that visitors talked about the city and interacted with local residents. For example, a 
few visitors were quite surprised that Bosnia was so geographically close to them. One woman 
from a Dutch organization expressed surprise at how close Srebrenica is to the Netherlands, but 
how different it is because of the war and the consequences of the war. The place has different 
needs and a different perspective. One young man from Germany was also surprised how close 
Bosnia is to Germany; in his mind he thought it was much further away.  
In the case of Srebrenica, the very presence of most of these visitors establish who has 
directed attention to Srebrenica as an object of attention—the organizations they represent or 
who have funded their visit to the city. Often they are part of organizations who have taken 
post-conflict situations as their mission: NGOs, non-profits, peacebuilding organizations, 
INGOs, universities, and media outlets that have been studying, documenting, reporting, and 
doing peacebuilding. Their very presence in the city suggests their ability to define, designate, 
name, and establish Srebrenica as an object of attention.  
There are two main ways that international visitors structure their knowledge about 
Srebrenica: ethnic identity and age. The most obvious for people coming to Srebrenica was the 
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aspect of ethnic identity. When asked about identity and how it influences the work the 
international visitor is doing in Srebrenica, the responses ranged from confusion by the question 
to a direct answer about how their work focuses on or changes based on that aspect of life.  
Just a few visitors really seemed not to be interested in ethnic identity at all. In their 
interviews, some of them didn’t seem to recognize it was an important aspect of life or of the 
war. Some others seemed to recognize its importance in understanding the war and present-day 
life. For example, one professor visiting from another part of Europe reported how his 
background in the country where he grew up (India) gives him the social capital necessary to 
understand the implications of identity and how to navigate those situations. A filmmaker from 
the U.S., noted that of course ethnic identity is an aspect of the daily lives of people in 
Srebrenica.  
Others tried to ignore it, or at least to reduce its centrality in their understanding the 
local environment. One researcher focused on the anthropology of food before, during, and 
after the war and was aware of ethnic identity as an important local concept. But she was keen 
to focus more on the ways that food blurred the lines of identity separation and in some cases 
created connections across ethnic dividing lines. Still, even in that sense, ethnic identity was a 
prominent factor in her work. 
Still others focused directly on it. On the one hand, some visitors used it as a way to 
make decisions about how they would work in the city. For example, one organization that 
focuses on preserving memories of the war worked exclusively with Muslim organizations. 
Another peacebuilder reported that his organization wanted him to focus on the ethnic identity 
of local individuals in order to ensure equity and awareness.  
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Some visitors used it to inform the methods they would use in interactions with local 
residents. For example, four visitors (Zahra, Abrahem, Fenna, and Sophie) suggested they 
would change the way they ask questions to local residents depending on the identity of the 
local resident, especially as it relates to the question of genocide and other topics related to the 
war. 
On the other hand, others’ focus on it was instead aimed at eradicating its importance in 
the city. One young woman stated that she wants to bring art and culture to Srebrenica as a 
means for people to see things differently (that is, so that they embrace difference and don’t 
create divisions between people). The filmmaker also noted that he wished they create a world 
wherein ethnic identity was not at all important.  
Another aspect that seemed to be important to international visitors was the age of the 
local residents with whom they were interacting. For many, their work was focused on the 
youth and their initiatives. Julian, Lotte, Tamara, Jerry, Bram, Lars, and Ankit all specifically 
remarked about the youth initiatives in the city. At the same time, many of them referred to the 
youth in ways that contrasted them with the older generation, where the older generation’s 
scars and wounds from the war are more direct.  
 Comparison 
The perspectives of these local residents and international visitors overlap in some ways 
and diverge in others. On the overlap, there is general consensus on the fact that a war 
40 
occurred, that the fact of the war had major consequences for the city, and that the city should 
be the object of attention by a lot of people, including the international community. 
But their images of Srebrenica differ in some important ways. For most international 
visitors, their image of Srebrenica fails to account for a lot of complexity and detail that local 
residents know. I cover this in the next chapter more, but for now simply point out that for the 
local residents, where and when Srebrenica emerged as an object of attention is continuous, 
with each July 11 that passes, with each local and national election, with each local scandal. It’s 
emergence is persistent, as compared to the international visitors’ image, which is static, 
typically starting and ending in 1995, occasionally punctuated by their own return visits to the 
city or by the occasional bubbling up of Srebrenica to the global news cycle. In the international 
image, so much of the local residents’ understanding of complexity and nuance is invisible. 
One more aspect of these interviews that is worth mentioning is the posture each of the 
groups took in thinking about Srebrenica. For each participant in the study, I started their first 
interview with the question, “What is interesting about Srebrenica today?” In one analysis of 
the data, I coded the statements in terms of their point of reference in time—past, present, or 
future—where it was relevant to the utterance made. Of the 36 utterances codable in the local 
residents’ answers, a posture toward the future was taken 10 times. A present-oriented posture 
characterized 21 of the 36 utterances by local residents, and a mere 5 of the utterances were 
backward looking to the past.  
In contrast, the international visitors were mostly focused on the present and the past, 
with a mere five mentions oriented to the future. Compared to the nearly 59% of utterances 
oriented to the present by the local residents, 45% of international visitors’ utterances were 
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oriented to the present. And nearly triple the percentage of utterances by local residents 
oriented to the past were utterances by international visitors referencing the past. And, the local 
residents’ utterances oriented to the future 27% of the time, whereas international visitors’ 
references were oriented to the future about 16% of the time. This is an important difference in 
the way Srebrenica emerges as an object to local residents and international visitors. The 
international visitors’ attention is brought to Srebrenica given the importance of its past, 
whereas the local residents’ attention is brought to Srebrenica given the important its presence 
and its future.  
 
 









Local Residents International Visitors
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 Attempts to Influence Others’ Objects 
When these two images of Srebrenica differ, both parties often notice. International 
visitors sometimes noticed where their image differs from what they expected and other times 
they noticed that their perspective of Srebrenica was different than that of local residents. Other 
times, local residents tried to point out to international visitors when they noticed visitors 
making different assumptions.10  
Many local residents carry a suspicion that international visitors likely think incorrectly 
about the city. One young man who served as a translator for a journalist from the Netherlands 
says that people “come with prejudices.” He asserts that international visitors have a different 
image: “you need to have some sort of mindset when you come to Srebrenica. It’s a specific 
space, specific town, specific things happened here. It’s unique and special in many ways. And 
you cannot be blind or deaf, so you probably have heard something about Srebrenica before 
you come here.”   
Another young activist and artist notes that she assumed that two international visitors 
she met would have come in with  
what you can hear about Srebrenica and what you can learn through different media or 
whatever; you can hear just about the previous things which have happened during the 
war, the end of the war, many people were killed, and genocide, and those kinds of 
things, and nothing else. And I saw many people who were coming with a lot of 
prejudice and many of them were not able to, didn’t want to, be open for real people’s 
stories. They wanted to follow what they, why they are here, so you know, just to get 
those answers. 
 
10 Some local residents avoid interacting with international visitors completely to avoid what they see as a 
high-risk situation for disturbing conversations. The war is usually the topic of choice (see Chapter 4); for 
local residents, twenty-five years have passed, and many of them lost loved ones. They don’t want to talk 
about the war. 
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Often, these local residents do try to influence how international visitors contextualize 
Srebrenica—how it emerges to them as an object of interest.  As an international visitor myself, 
this type of interaction, where the local resident explains what the correct image of Srebrenica 
is, occurred to me often, usually when I first would meet a local resident. While it happened 
most often during my first few months in the city, I experienced these conversations three and 
four years into my time there—when I met residents for the first time. I came to understand this 
to be a ritual; I was read as a visitor who likely has certain thoughts and therefore needs to be 
told such and such. 
One energetic young man felt that because two visitors came from outside, there was a 
likelihood that they need to be corrected about what they think about Srebrenica. “We as a 
group had the urge to point out at the beginning” that Srebrenica is not the picture that is in the 
international media. Another young father believes that most visitors come to Srebrenica with 
the impression that what happened there couldn’t have happened in the place from which the 
visitor had come. He tries to reset how Srebrenica emerged as an object of attention for them by 
describing to the visitors what Srebrenica was like before the war.  
A young musician is also keen to change the way that international visitors think about 
Srebrenica. He has made it his mission to seek out interactions with international visitors in 
order to show them that Srebrenica once was a great city. Similarly to the young father, he is 
attempting to reset how Srebrenica has emerged for them as an object of attention in the first 
place.  
All of this anecdotal evidence suggests that local residents do often try to influence how 
Srebrenica became and remains an object of attention for these international visitors. And all of 
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this effort raises the question as to whether residents are ever effective at changing the way the 
visitors think about Srebrenica. It raises the question as to whether any attempts at changing the 
way a person imagines an object are actually successful.  
In one case from data, it was. Greta came to Srebrenica from Italy with some friends 
after hearing about Ahmed, a local resident, and his work in Srebrenica. Ahmed focuses on 
connecting people to nature and the natural rhythms of life, while at the same time showing a 
side of Srebrenica that often gets missed in the international media surrounding it. When she 
came, Greta says what motivated her was, in part, having read a book about a girl who, about 
Greta’s age, had survived the war in Bosnia.  
The book had been meaningful to her not only because she could relate to the girl, but 
because she had been in the former Yugoslavia before the war with her family on vacation. She 
remembers that when the war started, she was shocked for two reasons. It was so close to her 
home in Italy, but she’d also thought that war was obsolete because of the way that her 
grandparents and parents had talked about World War II.  
In her interview, she told me that she and her friends had planned an art installation in 
the city that would commemorate the massacre from 1995. But, after speaking with Ahmed, she 
reported, 
I think that we felt that nobody needed that again. I mean, nobody here needs to talk 
about it again….Ahmed told us about that, and he suggested us to start working on the 
project [while we were] staying here. …We are [doing this public art installation], and 
everyone can see it, so you have to think about what these people need. So I think what 
people here need is not to talk about that in that gloomy sense again. And I don’t feel 
entitled to talk about that.  
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From Ahmed’s perspective, he confirms this recollection of events. He says that 99% of 
people who are coming to Srebrenica already have a stereotype of Srebrenica in mind, so it’s 
really hard to get them out of that thinking, to get them to see from a different perspective. He 
tried to influence their work, but he also wanted to be careful not to intrude too much. He 
advised them that putting in an art installation in Srebrenica is not like putting it in any other 
city. It can have a much wider impact and effect.  
He was trying to get them to focus less on the war, and more on the experiences that 
they had while they were visiting the city. “I’m really surprised with what they [included in the 
art installation]. There is basically that experience, what was important for all of them, from the 
food with the people, to the tools of that guy, to the coffee with Lamija, or whatever.” He’s 
referring to the pictures they included of food, a tool, and coffee in their art installation. 
So, Greta had listened. He influenced her to reconsider, but also to understand that from 
a local perspective, another memory of the war was about the last thing the residents of the city 
would want. Instead, they decided to paint portraits of the people they had met during their 
visit.  
In this case, Ahmed had been successful in influencing the focus that took Greta’s 
attention for the project away from the war and toward present-day life. He’d successfully 
changed the context in which Srebrenica was emerging as a discursive object of attention. He 
changed her focus away from the past and toward the present, everyday aspects of life of the 
local individuals with whom they’d interacted to align more closely with the image local 
residents have of Srebrenica. Greta confirms that in her interview, and the art installation as 
completed confirms that. In Foucauldian terms, he changed how the object emerged for Greta. 
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3.0 Chapter 3: The ‘Authorities’ on Srebrenica 
This chapter focuses on the next of the three parts of Foucault’s framework, ‘authority,’ 
which asks and answers questions about who has the authority to speak about Srebrenica and 
from what institutions they are able to do so. First, I look from the perspective of the local 
residents, then from the perspective of the international discourse around Srebrenica. Then I 
compare and contrast these perspectives, using ethnographic, interview, and participant 
observation data to provide qualitative examples. 
 The Local Residents’ Authorities 
To understand the image of Srebrenica held by these local residents, it’s important to 
understand who has credibility to speak about Srebrenica, what position those individuals can 
take, and from which institutional spaces in society they can speak. In this case, from this 
mostly marginalized population, acknowledgement and authority to speak about Srebrenica is 
granted selectively based on a few criteria. For the most part, to be granted authority requires 
one not to be a politician, not to be affiliated with a political party, to live in Srebrenica, to be 
marginalized, relatively poor, and, usually, not to be chauvinist. That latter point is negotiable. 
For Srebrenica, from this marginalized perspective, the sites from which people can 
speak are exclusively those outside the institutions of government; this can include cultural 
spaces, cafes, other places of business, private homes, and in nature. One cannot speak from 
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political sites, or from religious centers; both of those sites are suspect: if you are speaking from 
them, it is unclear whether you are being genuine or whether your statements are ‘politika.’ 
This was a difficult concept for me to understand in my ethnographic study, but it 
became clear to me in one specific situation. There was a particularly chaotic period in the 
political scene in Srebrenica a few years ago, when the municipal assembly was trying to form a 
majority coalition. The coalition had been changing nearly daily, sometimes more, and the 
process had been particularly dramatic that year. Many local residents, observers, and the 
members of the assembly themselves noted how they hadn’t seen such difficulty in forming a 
persistent majority before.  
As a consequence, the directors of various local government agencies were being 
changed nearly daily, according to each new coalition formed, and any type of progress in the 
political atmosphere was stalled. It was at that time that one bureaucrat who had been removed 
from a directorship position was the topic of a local news story in which they related how they 
had been forcibly, physically removed from the local municipality offices by an armed guard. 
The way they described the situation was that they had felt threatened.  
Previously, I’d had coffee with them, and we’d developed an arms-length 
acquaintanceship. When I ran into them a day or two after this news story broke, I asked how 
they were doing, if they were alright. They nonchalantly answered that they were doing fine 
and asked how I was. I responded and then asked again, “Are you feeling alright?” They were 
puzzled and asked why I was asking them. I responded, describing the story I’d read and heard 
about in the city. They said, “Joj, Suzo, pusti to! To je samo politika!” In English, “Oh for 
goodness’ sake, Suzie, let that go! That’s just politics!” Translation: That was strategic. They had 
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used the situation probably to give some energy to their party, their ethnic group, and 
themselves at a time when the situation was already in great turmoil. 
The masquerade of this event as an incident and the brazen admission in a public place 
symbolizes one major reason that non-affiliated non-political local residents refuse to give these 
sites the authority to speak. The impossibility of distinguishing between genuine and strategic 
statement renders all statements from these sites suspect. As such, the sites from which 
authorities can speak and be acknowledged by this group of individuals is quite limited.   
In this local situation, the local residents of Srebrenica take the position of receiver or 
victim of the system, the authoritative commentator, but one who never has enough power to 
do anything to change the situation. They can translate the public statements made by the 
political class, clarify to outsiders what the real situation is, and describe the lived consequences 
of this situation. But they cannot take the position of change agent. 
For the local residents whom I describe, few people are granted authoritative voice on 
Srebrenica; those who are usually must at least live in Srebrenica now or recently; those who are 
not are typically ‘outsiders,’ politicians, and chauvinists. In this way, the authorities are 
different, and they are hierarchical. 
 The International Visitors’ Authorities 
From the international visitors’ perspective, I want to start with a broader perspective. 
From the more general context surrounding Srebrenica as it emerged in the 1990s onto the 
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international map, the authorities afforded the right to use language around the conflicts of the 
90s are characterized by a few markers. The first and probably most obvious is that they come 
from the ‘west,’ granting them an experiential and knowledge-based competence in ‘progress,’ 
democracy, and economics. Given that background, those recognized as experts are academics 
who have studied the conflicts, policymakers, practitioners of peacebuilding, international 
political figures, military leaders, and notably, journalists and actors.  
It is probably the case that some of these figures have more or less prestige, and that the 
level of prestige held is at least partially dependent on the audience who presumes the 
authority’s statements to be true. The more formal in this list (academics, policymakers, political 
figures, e.g.) are typically granted the assumption that what they speak is, at least, accurate. 
Included as authorities are a variety of institutions, including the various programs within the 
United Nations, NATO, the African Union, other prestigious IGOs, as well as a collection of 
INGOs, universities, and some think tanks, such as the International Crisis Group. This also 
includes the ICTY. It is within these bodies that the discourse used by authorities are 
authorized. Human rights organizations also offer sites from which authorities can speak.  
In the cases of journalists and actors, a perhaps more insightful discussion would be to 
lay out on what grounds prestige is granted. Most certainly included here is time spent by the 
journalist in the field, level of involvement in the conflict, breadth of experience across 
geographies, and involvement in their resolution. In some more cynical cases, the degree to 
which one exposed herself to danger in witnessing the conflict also adds prestige. 
The recognition offered to them lends special insight into this question: the site from 
which they can credibly speak are the sites of conflict themselves. It is through their witnessing 
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the conflict that they increase credibility. Contrast this with the credibility of a person who 
witnesses the conflict because they come from the place where conflict occurs, whose credibility 
will most certainly be approached with skepticism.  
Muslim residents are authorities on their own experiences and traumas, but perhaps less 
so on the broader context of the war. In Srebrenica, Serbian residents are rarely afforded 
authoritative voice in any case.  
 Comparison 
In the case of most local residents and international visitors I interviewed, there were 
very few overlaps in whom they considered to be authorities on Srebrenica. For international 
visitors, while local residents could be seen as experts, it was usually only as experts on their 
own individual experiences, and even that was often impossible for some local residents. For 
local residents, the very fact that most of their criteria require that authoritative voices balance 
the future with the past, center politics as the root of most problems in the city, know the lived 
experiences of residents in Srebrenica personally, and lack political representation to effect 
change renders most of their authorities powerless and unrecognized by international visitors. 
The two sources of authoritative knowledge about Srebrenica could not be further separated.  
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 Attempts to Influence Others’ Authorities 
Marta came to Srebrenica to pilot a new project she and her organization, affiliated with 
a research university in the UK, had developed to coach youth in post-conflict situations on 
cultural entrepreneurship. It was a train-the-trainer program, wherein the youth who 
participated spent a week’s time and learned how to conduct a training program for other 
youth in the region. The focus of the program they were to give to their peers was to train them 
on finding alternative means of funding their projects, such as repurposing spaces, crowd-
sourcing, and up-cycling materials. The program itself was comprised of ideas that the 
organization had crowd-sourced and collected; they were success stories from quite resourceful 
youth around the world, whose circumstances would otherwise predict low chances for the 
success of any entrepreneurial initiatives.  
The train-the-trainer programming that these youth attended focused on helping them 
contextualize the content of the trainings they would eventually implement to the local 
situation. For that reason, much of the week of day-long sessions was focused on taking the 
chassis of the training and customizing the attachments to it to the local situation. In that sense, 
the programming actively sought out and depended upon a clear understanding of Srebrenica 
today. The youth eagerly provided that context. And because the programming relied on the 
local contextualization, it squarely placed the local youth as the authority on Srebrenica in 
practice.  
The picture they painted of Srebrenica was bleak. Andjela describes what it was like at 
the beginning of the week: “All of us were so negative…whenever [Marta] was trying to 
52 
encourage us, we were like, ‘this is not possible here.’ And I heard that so many times, and I 
heard it from myself!” Ana also felt that Marta couldn’t understand the local context because 
she had a western way of thinking, not in the sense of a cultural divide but rather different 
political and economic experiences. She didn’t think it was possible for Marta to understand the 
mentality of the local political elite, the political situation, the corruption, and the manipulation 
that happens.  
Marta heard throughout the training that it is more or less impossible to accomplish 
anything in Srebrenica. With corrupt politicians, an ethno-feudal economic system, and a local 
population barely able to sustain their own survival, none of the ideas presented by Marta, 
imported from other places, would be successful in Srebrenica. Crowdsourcing wouldn’t work 
here; the local population is too poor, the youth told her. There is no space for youth to be 
creative, and they can’t afford to rent out space, they told her. People are apathetic and 
hopeless; who would even come to such a training?, they asked.  
But by the end of the week, more than a few of them had really changed their minds. 
Andjela reported a new energy among the youth who had attended. Slobodan saw how he 
would be able to take the project he’d had in mind, but for which he’d struggled to find 
funding, and realize it. Zeljka mourned the past two years she’d wasted, thinking she had 
nothing to do because she hadn’t been able to find employment. In a few months’ time, she was 
heading to another country in Europe to work and now wished that she’d spent the time in 
Srebrenica working toward a project from this perspective.  
This situation represents one of the few instances where the international visitor 
successfully influenced local residents’ image of Srebrenica and established themselves as an 
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authority in the discourse of the local residents’ image of Srebrenica. Slobodan and Andjela 
remarked how Marta seemed to come into the city without seeming to know anything; she 
hadn’t exposed her thinking about Srebrenica to the local youth. But she was also careful to 
treat the local youth as the authority, in the Foucauldian sense. She was specifically asking them 
for their local expertise, and specifically not asking Google, or local politicians for example. For 
her, the youth were the ones, during their interactions at least, who were afforded the right to 
speak about Srebrenica. By the end of their week together, most of the youth (with the exception 
of Ana) had accepted Marta’s authority about what was possible in Srebrenica.  
In contrast to most of the rest of the youth, Ana did not accept Marta as an authority on 
what’s possible in Srebrenica. She felt that Marta couldn’t understand the local context because 
she had a western way of thinking, not in the sense of a cultural divide but rather different 
political and economic experiences. She didn’t think it was possible for Marta to understand the 
mentality of the local political elite, the political situation, the corruption, and the manipulation 
that happens.  
Only Ana had remained skeptical of the possibility of this working in Srebrenica. Ana 
has had multiple experiences of her own where her personal efforts have been destroyed by 
political intrigue and the local ‘mentality.’ She has also witnessed the struggle her parents have 
had to survive in their work in many NGOs, INGOs, and IGOs. She felt Marta couldn’t really 
understand the local context. And she wasn’t there long enough to really understand the local 
context in any case. In Ana’s case, she was rejecting Marta’s authority. 
Ana had an experience a few years’ prior where her effort and success at planning and 
then bringing to reality a huge event for the city was ruined by a dispute with a local resident. 
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The municipality sided with the local resident, and she was devastated when she had to cancel 
the events just a few hours into it. The disappointment after all that personal effort impacted 
her, as probably did the personal embarrassment of having been the public target of a 
complaint.  
In Ana’s case, Marta’s optimism simply wouldn’t do much to recast into a different light 
the situation they were in locally. Ana was, and remained, the authority; she did not grant 
Marta authority to speak about what was possible in Srebrenica, even if she was an expert in 
what had been possible in other post-conflict situations around the world, the way that her local 
counterparts in the training had. Her previous experiences determined her level of optimism 
despite the effort on Marta’s part.11  
Nedim, a local resident, has put a lot of effort and time into trying to influence 
international visitors to understand the local context the same way he does. He reports that he’s 
“giving 200%” of himself to this endeavor and trying through conversation to change the minds 
of the visitors he meets. He is trying by being completely honest, and revealing everything, 
even when honesty reveals what is so messed up about the town.  
Nedim’s contrasting experience with two organizations is instructive. On the first, he 
worked closely with a woman named Lotte. She and the organization she represents have, at 
least up to now, remained committed to a major project despite slowdowns, setbacks, and a 
 
11 It’s worth noting that Ana’s reading of the local situation, in the long run, seems to be the more 
accurate. Economically, the situation in Srebrenica is deteriorating. Politically, elections are divided and 
day to day politics seem to be as corrupt as they ever were. The local youth are still leaving, and one of 
the biggest projects, partially inspired by some of the youth involved in Marta’s project, is yet unfinished. 
Whether due to COVID or politics as usual in Srebrenica remains to be seen. 
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local situation that is in her opinion bewilderingly corrupt and unrecognizable given her 
experiences.  
Lotte reported to me in our interview that she does not think she really knows the local 
people very well and is self-consciously aware of the fact that aside from Nedim and another 
young man who works with him, she’s not really gotten to know many local residents. And for 
that, she admits that she doesn’t really know if she understands the local situation. But Lotte 
was one of the international visitors I interviewed who had had experiences in Srebrenica prior 
to my interactions with her. Her humility in her approach to Srebrenica was something she had 
learned through time, and specifically through interactions with Nedim. She reported to me 
that Nedim had changed her perspective on Srebrenica. 
In his interview with me, Nedim provides a bit more insight into what exactly occurred. 
A few years before this, Lotte’s organization and another organization from Italy had a meeting 
about bringing a series of week-long events and projects to Srebrenica. Nedim describes his 
frustration during that meeting because the ideas the people were coming up with were ones 
that were nonsensical in the context of Srebrenica. “They brought to us all ideas from Italy [and 
said,] ’we would like you to be a part of this story.’”  
He said that in that moment it became clear to him how hard the project was going to 
be: what he saw was a group of very young, seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds coming from 
western Europe, who have fun in their lives, who are living their lives, and simply can’t 
understand why a normal thing [the idea they are proposing], which is really a normal thing 
that’s good for everyone in the town and for the government and for all the governments in 
Bosnia, just won’t work. Why [won’t it work]? There is no answer. 
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So Nedim spoke up that meeting and tried to impress upon the group why the ideas 
they had proposed were unlikely to work.  
At the meeting, Tamara, another international visitor with a long track record of visits to 
Srebrenica, and who was involved in that initial project, after having listened to all the ideas 
proposed and to Nedim’s response to them, stood up and said, “All this sounds interesting and 
it sounds good, but why didn’t we ask people here, people from Srebrenica, what they really 
need and what they think is good for them?” Nedim says that after she said that, “it was like 
twenty minutes of silence in the meeting.”  
It was about half an hour later that he spoke with Lotte, who at that time had told him 
that she felt very uncomfortable that they hadn’t realized this very obvious thing from the very 
beginning. While he can’t say definitively from what moment Lotte really realized what he had 
been trying to do, he reports that they eventually had a very different relationship with each 
other.  
Lotte reports in her interview with me that originally, she now realizes, they came to 
Srebrenica with too much of their own ideas, their own plans, and their own enthusiasm, 
without really understanding the local people or environment.  
I think we came here with too much a western point of view and that we didn’t realize 
enough at first, that this is a different country, with a very different and tragic recent 
history, and that people here maybe in general are in need of completely different things 
than we were thinking… 
 
She reports that she does think that Nedim has been trying to influence the way that she 
understands Srebrenica and how life in it works.  
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In this case, Nedim tried to influence two different organizations, but appears to have 
only been successful at changing the way one organization, and particularly Lotte, viewed him. 
More specifically, Nedim was successful at getting Lotte to recognize that he was an authority 
on the local situation, and this went a long way for him to influence the project they’d brought 
to the city. 
From the perspective of discourse, Lotte and Nedim had in mind at the beginning 
different authorities. Nedim’s strategy was to position himself as an authority on the local 
situation and context in order to be influential on Lotte. It seems he was successful. She and that 
organization began to defer to him and his counterpart for advice and guidance on what would 
happen and when on the project. He changed Lotte’s answer to the question, “Who is accorded 
the right to talk about authoritatively about Srebrenica?” from hers and other international 
organizations and herself to him.  
In contrast to Lotte, the result for the Italian organization seems to have been different. I 
do not have the benefit of having had an interview with them, but Nedim’s interview and my 
ethnographic data suggest that, while Nedim was trying to do the same thing with them, he 
had not successfully established himself as an authority in their eyes.  
A third example involves Stefan and Fenna. Stefan worked as a translator for Fenna, 
who is a freelance journalist who has been to Srebrenica on multiple occasions and has pretty 
extensive experience working and living in the former Yugoslavia. During this trip to 
Srebrenica, Fenna wanted to find out what local residents think about “politics, [the] rhetoric of 
politicians, like [how they are] playing national cards against each other, because it has an effect 
still.” This was especially relevant for the story she wanted to report because the mayor of 
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Srebrenica had been publicly denying genocide. Her work entailed interviews with local 
residents, especially Serbs, for which Stefan had been her translator.  
For his part, Stefan understands that most international visitors come with a particular 
perspective, an image of Srebrenica; no one can really come as a blank slate. He felt that way 
with Fenna, as well. So he “tried to give [her] an insight from the other [Serbian] side.” In his 
interview with me, Stefan said that he was purposely trying to show her a different side of 
Srebrenica, a different side of the history of Srebrenica, one where both sides had victims. He 
mentioned to me that she likely didn’t understand or accept what he was saying to her because 
he’d never published a book about it—i.e., he wasn’t an established authority.  He couldn’t see 
a different path to becoming one, either. 
In Fenna’s second interview with me, she confirmed; not only had Stefan not changed 
the way she understands Srebrenica, no one had. She did not consider him to be an authority on 
Srebrenica, and rejected his answer to her questions about victims of the war. Stefan seems to 
have understood the situation correctly—she did not see him as an authority and he was 
unsuccessful in his attempts to change that. 
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4.0 Chapter 4: The ‘Concepts’ of Srebrenica 
This chapter focuses on the last of the three parts of Foucault’s framework, ‘concepts,’ 
which asks and answers questions about how ideas come to be related to the discourse of 
Srebrenica for both of these groups in the first place and to understand how those ideas or 
concepts are related to one another. First, I look from the perspective of the local residents, then 
from the perspective of the international discourse around Srebrenica. Then I compare and 
contrast these perspectives. I use ethnographic, interview, and participant observation data to 
provide qualitative examples. 
 The Local Residents’ Concepts 
At the start of each of the interviews, I posed to the respondents the question, “What do 
you think is interesting about Srebrenica today?” A summary of their answers is in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: Local Residents' Concepts (Number of Utterances by Topic), n = 80 
 
The future and potential of the city was the most mentioned, indicating its importance to 
local residents. At the time of these interviews and the participant observations, a few residents 
were involved with projects sponsored by a few different foreign organizations: developing a 
craft beer brewery, a community center, new businesses opening. Others were encouraged that 
people seem to be returning to Srebrenica. In contrast, ethnographically, Srebrenica’s future 
seems to most residents pretty bleak. Many consider leaving, even if they never actually will.  
Srebrenica is rich in natural resources and natural beauty, and that is evidenced by the 
mentions made of it by so many local residents and its presence in the mind of people from an 
ethnographic perspective. It’s not unusual for impromptu hikes, trips to the lake, or casual 
groups going out together into the woods for a hike or to gather resources. Communion with 
nature is customary as well for the Orthodox on their major holidays, and the relationship 
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between nature’s cycles with the moon and sun determine the Muslim holiday dates. So it is not 
surprising how prominent the topic is. 
But in addition to enjoying nature, local residents still depend on the natural resources. 
They find and collect during the appropriate seasons various wild foods (e.g., wild mushrooms 
or cherries). They gather these resources for personal consumption, while others earn cash by 
selling what they gather. Some also rely on wood for their cooking and heating needs.  
Srebrenica also has a health spa that historically attracted people to the city to visit, 
famous for its healing waters. Srebrenica was, before the war, a vacation, relaxation, and 
healing spot. The natural surroundings of Srebrenica provide opportunities for exercise, 
relaxation, and exploration. And, the forest hides the remains of ancient structures and grave 
sites. Not far from Srebrenica is the Drina river, with its signature shade of green water. There is 
also a lake about an hour’s drive away that provides a day or weekend getaway from the city.  
The next most prominent topic mentioned by local residents was the economy.  
Economically, Srebrenica is depressed. There are not enough jobs in the city to employ most 
people, and while factories open, they don’t stay open for long. The local municipality is and 
has been taking steps to attract larger employers to the town, but with limited success. One 
recent initiative has been the push for the diaspora to invest in the city. 
Additionally, the jobs that do exist in Srebrenica, especially the best paying ones, are 
mostly occupied by people who do not live full-time in Srebrenica, and therefore, do not spend 
their money in the town. There is very little return to the city of the money earned there, 
necessary to sustain the businesses that are locally-owned and whose owners actually live in the 
city full time, e.g., the bars and cafes, the hair dressers, restaurants, and hotels.  
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Many residents in Srebrenica report dissatisfaction with politics there. There is a clear 
line between those who are politicians and those who are not. From the perspective of non-
politicians, the political class looks after its own interests and will resort to the lowest of tactics 
to remain in office, including stoking ethnic divisions or, as local residents will say, “putting 
their fingers in between people.” Many residents think that once in office, they do little to help 
Srebrenica become a better place, to have a solid future, and then they seek to be re-elected in 
the next election cycle. The effect on the non-political class is apathy and hopelessness. The 
political class blame the problems of the town on this apathy and hopelessness of the non-
political class. 
Equally to politics was mentioned the situation facing the youth in Srebrenica. 
Ethnographically, there are many youth and many organizations focused on supporting them 
in their education, in opportunities for them to travel, and opportunities to learn art and music. 
And there is a strong response in the community to support youth to engage in these activities.  
However, many youth leave the city because they don’t see a future. This is especially 
bittersweet because while they are leaving to pursue good opportunities elsewhere, they leave 
their families behind; many of them would prefer to stay. Worse, many of them have left after 
having faithfully persisted in trying to make something of their lives. When commenting about 
it in interactions with me, many of them have said that they cannot find a job without being 
affiliated with a political party. But they don’t want to affiliate with a party because to them it 
represents something unpalatable—“politika” (see chapter 3). It also signals a lack of 
independence, where party members must speak the party message, even if they don’t agree, or 
must participate in grotesque attempts to divide people. 
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A lot of respondents also talked about the people of Srebrenica, indicating how many of 
their friends and family are there. While war was the next-most common response, just one 
respondent made a direct reference to the war as an answer to this question.12 Other than that, 
other references to the war were made in order to frame some other, more contemporary aspect 
of life. One partly war-related topic that was mentioned only thrice was the relationship 
between ethnic groups, where respondents talked about how good coexistence is now, how 
peace is made possible through Dayton, and that the war was a disruption to brotherhood and 
unity among ethnic groups. 
After was, corruption was the next most common response. In Srebrenica, it usually 
refers to politicians taking money from the public coffers, either tax revenue or money donated 
to the city. Corruption of another ilk is the receipt of public funds by private citizens, in the 
form of grants to start a business, e.g. In exchange for getting the grant, the recipient knows 
they must return at least part of it to the party or to an individual who got them onto the grant 
list. Another form of corruption invariably presents itself around election time through the 
purchase of votes. This type of corruption is not really a secret. Most residents are aware of it, if 
they haven’t actually experienced or benefited from it personally.  Ethnographically, many 
citizens are aware of this corruption and dissatisfied.  
 
12 This interview was with Binjamin and was the first substantive interaction he and I had. For that 
reason, I wonder if his answer was another demonstration of that ritual reference to the war that happens 
between local residents and international visitors. That said, one local resident in Srebrenica reported to 
me during my Master’s fieldwork in Srebrenica that the war is always in the back of everyone’s minds. 
Based on my ethnographic experience, I think this is a good way to understand how people in the city 
live their lives. While the war is obviously an important part of all residents’ experiences of Srebrenica, it 
is typically not their immediate focus, rather as their responses show, it is one among many interesting 
aspects to the city.  
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As alluded to previously, and a conclusion that can be drawn from this description of 
residents’ answers to this question, the local population is tired. One respondent in my Master’s 
field research succinctly described this local apathy: no matter the initiative to make Srebrenica 
different or better, “We are assured we will fail.” This came through as a concept of 
hopelessness and apathy of the local resident population. 
Finally, local residents mentioned a variety of other interesting things about Srebrenica. 
During part of my field work, some improvements were being made to the main road that 
winds through the town. This included repair to the road, a new round-about, and sidewalks 
that reached nearly from one end of the city to the other. Others noted the culture of Srebrenica, 
wanting it to be recognized by the European Union, celebrating it, and noting the strong 
heritage of culture in the city. A few respondents mentioned wanting to change the image of 
Srebrenica in the international media, and a few talked about the strength of the history of 
Srebrenica, and two mentioned the freedom they enjoy in Srebrenica.  
Despite the mostly bleak picture this summary paints, there is a strong affection for the 
city that I want to note here at the end. Though many of its residents will complain about its 
economic depression, the political climate (which many consider to be a disaster), and the 
hopelessness they feel for the future of the city, they love it as their home, as the place they 
know, as the place they find their families and friends. They are proud of the welcoming and 
friendly culture, of its natural resources, of the peoples’ resourcefulness, and many peoples’ 
independence from and resilience to attempts to create conflict at the political level. They take 
pride in the identity Srebrencani. At the same time that many of them want to leave, they would 
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leave reluctantly. They would want to stay if only they could make a future for themselves and 
their families. 
Having identified the concepts related to Srebrenica, I want to describe how they relate 
to each other. From the local residents’ perspective, what they refer to as politics is the primary 
and central concept that connects to and dictates the possibilities for most of the others. Politics 
determines the city’s future, determines one’s access to the economy, and defines the city’s 
narrative of the past. In the minds of many local residents, the political situation is at the root of 
the problems facing the city today.  
Of course, the state of politics today is a direct descendant of the war and the post-war 
agreements. Without having resolved basic questions about culpability, without recognition of 
losses, and employing a political governing device that emphasizes ethnic identity to the 
detriment of other viable, flexible, complex identities, the political hold on Srebrenica is the 
ground zero of the problems in the city. For that reason, it’s important to understand how local 
residents relate politics as a concept to other concepts. 
Politicians emphasize ethnic division and war tensions in their campaigns at the same 
time they control political parties. Political parties, which require membership and attendance 
to and support of the party message—regardless of one’s personal endorsement—hold the keys 
to regular employment, in both private and public positions.  This ethno-feudal system in the 
context of the Dayton agreement all but guarantees the prominence of the use of ethnic identity 
for often corrupt political purposes in Srebrenica. Despite the local cosmopolitan voice, because 
they are not represented by an actual political party, local residents struggle.  
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Without influence on that political system, grabbing a hold of public coffers and 
ensuring that donations to the city are spent in sustainable ways that benefit the entire city is 
nearly impossible. For example, the opening of the spa has been held up in complicated layers 
of bureaucracy because the owner is in a different political party than the ruling party; that 
prevents the development of the economy and the preservation and care for natural beauty 
surrounding Srebrenica.  
As long as the economy is depressed, local individuals will continue to support 
whichever party assists them in gainful employment and will carry their message forward as 
well. In that sense, the knot that the unresolved issues from the war, the Dayton agreement, 
local corruption, and a depressed economy represent is held tightly constricted by politics. For 
local residents, it represents a death knell for any hope for a positive future in the city.  
What I set out in this section is not a definitive description of what Srebrenica is as a city, 
nor an ethnography that claims to understand it by reducing it to the concepts local residents 
use for sense making. Instead, I want to describe how these residents render these concepts 
logically relevant to each other. As described later, those logical connections differ greatly from 
the way international visitors understand the dominant concepts they attach to Srebrenica. I 
turn to that description now. 
67 
 The International Visitors’ Concepts 
I asked each of the international visitors the same question, “What’s interesting about 
Srebrenica today?” I have organized their answers into categories of concepts that seem to go 
together in Figure 4.2.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: International Visitors' Concepts, n = 75 
 
Perhaps unsurprising, of the twenty-five interviews I had with international visitors to 
Srebrenica, twenty of them framed their responses to the question with a direct reference to the 
war. Another nine comments were derivative from the war, focusing on other topics, but only 
as they compare or contrast to the war.  
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Some respondents just mentioned the war, without commentary, claiming ignorance of 
the war, or empathy for and sympathy with its victims. Related, many of them mentioned the 
consequences of the war being so evident still today. Others noted how the media coverage of 
the war influenced their impressions of Srebrenica.  
Some visitors were interested in what life is like today but framed it in terms of a 
contrast to the war. They wanted to know about this instead of knowing about the war, or how 
that life is possible given the fact of the war. Expectedly, many respondents narrowed their 
response to the reason they personally came to Srebrenica, and for many, that reason was the 
war. They wanted to understand more about how memory and place are tied together and how 
that expresses itself through music, or the history of the DutchBat, to take two examples.13  
A few respondents also mentioned cultural aspects of contemporary Srebrenica. They 
talked about the relaxing pace of life, the activities, music, and the hospitality and 
resourcefulness of local people. All of these were mentioned in relationship to the war. 
Aside from the war, international visitors also mentioned nature and natural resources. 
They noted Srebrenica’s natural beauty and focus on agriculture. Another common mention 
was the local spa.  
Quite a few visitors also talked about the youth in response to this question. Often they 
wanted to support the youth in trying to improve Srebrenica’s future. Some were just interested 
13 Dutchbat is a term for the Dutch Battalion of the U.N. force placed in Srebrenica during the war, a 
controversial figure because it was present in Potocari when the genocide began. There has been a hard 
fought effort on the part of some survivors of the genocide to find the U.N. and the DutchBat responsible 
for the genocide, for not stopping the Bosnian Serb Army from taking the Muslim men out of Potocari, 
and as some have accused, for actually assisting in their separation from their families.   
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in understanding the youth perspective of Srebrenica, given they represent the generation that 
grew up after the end of the war.  
Another theme in the international visitor interviews was the relationship between 
ethnic groups, with most mentioning that things are better than they initially expected. Some 
were surprised to find Serbs and Bosniaks living and socializing together, with very little 
conflict, or to learn of a Srebrenican identity. One of them suspected that while it looks like 
everyone is living together, the ties were not that deep. 
Aside from these more common themes, a handful of topics were mentioned just once 
by international visitors in response to this one question. These included Srebrenica’s proximity 
to Europe, the contradictions one notices in the way local residents talk about Srebrenica (more 
on this later), the architecture of the city, the difficulty of the economic situation, and the apathy 
of the local residents.  
The most obvious characteristic of the corpus of visitors’ answers was the overwhelming 
amount of attention that is given to the war and war-related topics. This is unsurprising as 
Srebrenica is internationally known for its war history. Most international visitors who come to 
Srebrenica come because they have some idea of the place as it related to the war. 
As I did with the local residents, it’s important to understand how international visitors 
logically relate these concepts one to another. In the same way that politics is the central 
organizing concept for local residents, ethnic identity serves that function for international 
visitors. Ethnic identity is the primary organizing concept for all the others—the economy, 
progress, the future, and politics.  
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To understand the international visitor’s understanding of ethnic identity in Srebrenica, 
it is not unimportant that Srebrenica, for most international visitors, emerged as a discourse in 
the 1990s, that this specific period of time was marked internationally as a period of ethnic war, 
and that ethnic identity—a powerful discursive formation in its own right, on both the 
international and local sides—was cited as a cause of the war. 
Srebrenica emerged as a case of ethnic conflict, explanations of which were based on 
theories of ethnic war, which included theories about how politics, economics, ethnicity, human 
nature, and other concepts could produce wars of this type.  Prior to the development of these 
theories, a whole genre of academic work on nationalism already existed and largely informed 
the ethnic conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding literature that came later. That was 
instrumental in leading to ethnic identity playing a leading role in helping some of the major 
international actors understand these ‘new’ conflicts emerging in the 1990s, including the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.  
As a central concept in these theories of nationalism, theories of conflict of the 1990s, and 
theories of peacebuilding, it is unsurprising that so many of the international visitors I 
interviewed and observed also focused on ethnic identity as a central organizing concept for 
their own discourse on Srebrenica. For most international visitors, ethnic identity as a concept 
helps with sense making, providing an orienting and simplifying framework for understanding 
local life. In fact, in many cases, it seemed that international visitors were preoccupied with 
ethnic identity as a means of understanding local life—they couldn’t come to conclusions for 
themselves about how to interpret their interactions without knowing who’s who. This is 
evidenced by the focus so many international visitors gave it.  
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Some visitors focused on it more to ensure parity between groups in their relationships 
and projects with local residents, and to inform the methodology they used to implement their 
projects and in this way they emphasized it. Some visitors used ethnic identity to help explain 
things or reduce ambiguity and help decipher what should be expected. Ethnic identity helped 
them fill in otherwise incomplete information about the local context. In each case, these uses 
were powerful in their ability to influence the international visitor’s understanding of 
Srebrenica, and importantly, influence the knowledge they held about Srebrenica.  
But beyond simply focusing on ethnic identity, international visitors also used it for 
sense making. Quite a few visitors indicated in one way or another that they had witnessed or 
noticed differences between Serbs and Muslims. Others purposefully tried to find out who was 
Muslim or Serb. Aside from this more general preoccupation with ethnic identity, visitors were 
also concerned about parity and equity in their own actions and in the programming they 
brought to the city, quite careful to avoid the appearance of being biased more toward or 
connected more with one or the other group.  
For other international visitors, ethnic identity influenced the methodology of their 
projects. Several international visitors reported that they would ask different questions, pose 
similar questions differently, and interpret the answers they would receive depending upon the 
ethnic identity of the local resident.  
In addition to influencing methodology, ethnic identity as a central organizing concept 
also helped international visitors fill in and make sense of other observations they had made. 
One illustrative example came from a respondent who relayed to me that they understood that 
students go to the local school at different times--one time period is for Bosniaks and the other 
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one is for Serbs. I asked them if someone had told them about that, and they mentioned that 
another international visitor who had some tenure in the city told them the school system was 
two-tiered. I asked if that person had told them that it was a two-tier system based on ethnicity 
or just simply a two-tier system. They said the other visitor had not said anything about ethnic 
identity, but that they had just assumed that the two tiers were based on ethnicity, because, 
well, that’s what a two-tier system in Bosnia would look like.14 
This brief survey of examples shows how international visitors use the concept ethnic 
identity as a primary organizing device. There are two important characteristics of this use of 
ethnic identity that are important to understand. The first is a concept from Brubaker (2004), 
who calls this focus on ethnic groups as homogenous actors groupism. He argues that a tendency 
towards groupism leads people to accept what leaders and groups say on behalf of the ethnic 
groups they represent without really evaluating the extent to which the members of those 
ethnic groups support them or, more specifically, their statements.  
One concrete example of this groupism came through with Fenna’s approach to the 
work that brought her to Srebrenica. Because the mayor of Srebrenica was at the time a Bosnian 
Serb, she wanted to do a story about that, and more specifically his denial of genocide against 
Muslims. Because he was Serb and the topic was genocide denial, she felt that identity was 
important to her work and so wanted to know the identity of the people whom she interviewed. 
She did not struggle to identify who was Serb versus Muslim. I asked her how she knows, and 
 
14 In fact, there is a two-tier system, but it is based on morning and evening classes where both Serbs and 
Muslims go to either session. This is true for the high school only, as far as I understand it, and it has been 
that way since before the war. The motivating problem behind the two-tier system was not ethnic 
animosity and separation, but in fact that the school was too small to hold all the students at one time. 
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she mentioned that she can tell based on the answer—if they approve or disapprove of the 
Serbian mayor’s denial of genocide. Presumably, those who agree are Serbian, and those who 
disagree not. 
She would presume a person’s ethnic identity based upon their opinion of the mayor. 
According to her logic, the mayor is Serbian and Serbs support his opinion while Muslims do 
not. Ergo, when a person disagrees with the mayor, the person is Muslim, and when not, 
Serbian. The logical result renders the possibility of finding Serbs who disagree with him 
impossible—they must be Muslim. The fact is, there is a vibrant population of Serbs who 
disagree with him considerably, not just about policy issues but also with his explanations of 
the war and his denial of genocide. In that sense, groupism renders invisible the heterogeneity 
within groups, reinforcing and duplicating the international visitors’ understanding of ethnic 
identity errantly.  
The second characteristic associated with this focus on ethnic identity comes from 
Hayden (2007), who identifies a negative moral valence often put to ethnic identity in the 
literature on the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic identity is seen as a cause of war leading to such 
catastrophic consequences and usually referred to as closer to human nature, and therefore, 
unrefined. One understands that to value ethnic identity or national association, at least when 
one is not from the west, is to be backward or inferior.  
Hayden (2007) argues that by taking such an understandable stance, scholars and 
policy-makers skew their vision of the reality of life for many individuals living in Bosnia. From 
my ethnographic and interview data, that negative moral valence also marked how 
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international visitors to the city related ethnic identity to other concepts and how they 
understood Srebrenica and the local residents they interacted with.  
Some international visitors expressed this to me sometimes very directly in the way they 
spoke about it as a concept. At other times, the negative moral valence was evident in the ways 
that visitors understood its origins and its consequences, and the extent to which some visitors 
seemed to be self-conscious about the topic. In some cases, the visitors reported explicitly trying 
to eradicate it as a concept in the local mind at all.  
A few visitors simply cast ethnic identity in a negative light. For example, one indicated 
that growing up where ethnic identity is important is not a positive environment. Another 
participant notes that, “Sadly, [ethnic] identity is of interest, because I would prefer for us to 
live in a world in which identity is not important…So tragically, yes, identity is important…it is 
part of the reality that one has to deal with, but it is a tragic reality.”  
Other visitors applied a negative valence to ethnic identity in terms of its consequences 
for society revealing the inferred conclusion that ethnic identity in any capacity is negative. 
Ethnic identity serves only to divide people and ethnic identity prevents the possibility of 
cooperation. On other occasions, international visitors were focused on actually trying to 
eradicate it from the local context—to get local residents to forget their identities and instead 
focus on things like art, culture, or music.  
In fact, only two international visitors referenced ethnic identity in a positive light. One 
visitor saw ethnic identity as a strong motivating factor that is tied to place; he thinks it has 
brought people back to Bosnia even though perhaps their lives would have been better in 
Germany. Another felt that it prevents people from being close-minded.  
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 Comparison 
Having described to some detail the ways that local residents and international visitors 
think about Srebrenica, I want to compare and contrast these images, using a graph that 
combines the earlier graphs. The first thing that is noticeable about the similarities between 
these two sets of answers is that both populations answer the questions using a wide range of 
topics: international visitors mentioned 17 topics and local residents mentioned 16. Otherwise, 
just two topics reached near parity between them: nature and the youth. 
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The answers to the question also give pretty good insight into the differences between 
the concepts local residents and international visitors relate to Srebrenica. There are a few 
differences worth mentioning. Earlier, I shared a graph that showed how local residents focus 
mostly on the present and the future, but the international visitors focused mostly on the past. 
The graph here shows how that temporal focus is tied to the concepts each group seems to focus 
on more. Another difference is how closely related each of the local residents’ concepts were to 
each other and that so many of them identified the same concepts over and over again; in 
contrast, a lot of the concepts mentioned by international visitors were mentioned by only one 
or two of them. Lastly, there was a limited amount of overlap between the concepts across the 
groups. Where local residents mentioned politics a lot, for example, international visitors barely 
mentioned it. 
Rather than focus on contrasting the number of mentions between these two groups, I 
want to focus on the second important aspect of concepts in the Foucauldian sense—how they 
relate to one another. As alluded to previously, local residents organize their image and 
understanding of Srebrenica largely around the concept of politics, while international visitors 
organize their understanding of Srebrenica around ethnic identity. This is an important 
difference that often strains conversations between local residents and international visitors.  
As described in chapter 2, Srebrenica becomes an object of attention for local residents 
when the image is used in a political way for political gain. Politics for local residents represents 
an insurmountable object to be overcome if they ever want the present or the future to be better. 
Srebrenica became for many an image of suffering, a valuable political tool in both the Muslim 
and the Serbian narratives around the war. It is still used in this way by both sides today. 
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Between ethnic groups, that image is most certainly contested. But this image of Srebrenica is 
also contested between those politicians who use it as a tool and those local residents I focus on 
here. Mostly marginalized, they are impacted by a backward-looking, hate-filled, infamous 
image of Srebrenica and its political use, which is from their perspective mostly negative.  
For them, this politics stifles any chance for progress in the town. Politicians use 
Srebrenica during elections to incite fear and animosity to garner votes, which alleviates any 
pressure on them to make improvements to the town’s economic, social, and political situation. 
At the same time, most of these local residents believe those politicians to be highly corrupt, 
skimming project funds and government coffers. When politicians and other groups use that 
contested, backward-focused, fear-inciting image of Srebrenica, the future for these individuals 
is bleak and hopeless. To them, it seems things will never change for this town. Understanding 
that, it makes sense that for local residents, politics is the cause of most problems in the city.  
In contrast to that, most international visitors presume politics to be a solution to what 
they understand to be the real problem—ethnic identity. International visitors barely mentioned 
politics as a concept in their interviews, but during my ethnographic and participant 
observations, it was clear that international visitors see ethnic identity as the central organizing 
concept.  
This focus on ethnic identity has its roots in the academic literature on nationalism, a 
field of work tasked with explaining why that particular form of politics emerged with force at 
a particular time in history. Most theories share two separate elements. One is the nation, a 
group of individuals from the same ethnic background. The second is the state, the 
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governmental apparatus those nations seek to control. Most theories take these two elements 
and combine them in different ways in order to explain how nationalism emerged when it did. 
What’s important to note across all of these explanations is the very existential 
connection these theories make between ethnic identity and nationhood. The individual is by 
nature, search for survival, or psychological motivation connected to their ethnic identity. 
Therefore, ethnic identity is an explanatory variable in understanding nationalism as a concept. 
As such, it is also a powerful explanation in the origin of the conflicts of the 1990s, including in 
the former Yugoslavia.  
Over time, more sophisticated analyses of these conflicts have emerged that focus less 
on ethnic identity, and more on other modern problems. Ramet (2006:600) argues that system 
illegitimacy—lack of democracy and human rights, for example—is what drove the conflicts, 
and nationalism is also a product of that systemic illegitimacy. Meanwhile, Woodward (1995) 
suggests that it was international neoliberal policy requirements that triggered the crisis in the 
former federation. These economic policies were being implemented at the same time that the 
constitutions of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia were being re-written. As a 
consequence, those neoliberal policies created a heightened sense of insecurity for the 
individual who happened also to find themselves in a tumultuous political situation. 
These analyses help explain why international visitors relate their concepts ethnic 
identity and politics to Srebrenica so differently from the way local residents do so. Ethnic 
identity is the original problem, and a properly functioning political system, presumably liberal 
democracy, with an effective economic system, is the solution. To change the situation in 
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Srebrenica, according to international visitors, local residents needed to turn more toward 
politics, rather than away from it.  
These local residents could not disagree more, on both accounts. As noted, these 
residents see politics as the problem, not a solution to it, but are also intimately familiar with the 
impossibility of taking control of the political apparatus given the constitutional structure of the 
country. Beyond that, however, local residents also view ethnic identity as a concept in a 
profoundly different way.15 To contrast it with the way international visitors use that concept, 
local residents very much appreciate the heterogeneity within ethnic groups, and apply a very 
neutral valence to ethnic identity. 
On heterogeneity within ethnic groups, local residents use a variety of concepts to 
reconcile what looks to international visitors as an impossible contradiction. Obviously, there 
did occur in the 1990s a war that was characterized and understood by local residents and 
international actors alike as a war between ethnic groups. So, it’s clear to local residents that 
ethnic identity can be used to create divisions between people. Ethnic identity as somehow 
problematic and leading to conflict makes sense to local residents, but they employ a range of 
other devices and concepts to resolve what might seem like contradictions.  
For example, some in the Muslim population, when talking about the war, would 
distinguish between Serbs and Cetniks, a reference to the more chauvinistic and nationalist 
members of the ethnic group. Importantly, this is a distinction that Serbs will also make. There 
 
15 Ethnic identity as a concept in the local context remains partially elusive to me, even given nearly four 
full years in the city. For the record, I report here what I understand the local concept to be but always 
from an international perspective; while informed by many experiences and years in the city, my 
description should be taken as such. 
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is also the term Ustasha, which locally refers to chauvinists who are Croatian.16 This distinction 
allows them to hold two truths simultaneously: they have affection for the ethnic other, while 
the ethnic other killed members of their group and use chauvinist and aggressive language still. 
Another example is the designation posteni ljudi (‘good people’), which takes precedence 
over ethnic designation, emphasizing the reputation and personal relationships residents have 
developed for themselves and with others. The reasoning behind this designation is that there 
are good and bad people of all ethnic backgrounds. It’s more important to know their 
reputation than it is to know their family name. This distinction allows them to retain their 
understanding of the war, which emphasizes ethnic animosity and crimes of ethnic aggression, 
while also retaining and building new relationships with others of different backgrounds. Local 
residents understand this and a great deal of other complexity and fluidity in their use of ethnic 
identity.  
In contrast, international visitors often fail to see the nuances within ethnic groups. The 
presumption is that there is little heterogeneity in any case, so little reason to look for the ways 
 
16 Interestingly, I do not remember nor can I find a note that I ever heard a term that primarily 
distinguished between chauvinists and non-chauvinists in the Muslim population. There are probably a 
few reasons for this. Firstly, Ustasa and Cetnik are names that became more common during and after the 
Second World War, and while there were Muslims who fought in other regiments, according to local 
accounts, most Muslims fought with the Partizani, an anti-fascist group comprised of many ethnicities. 
Secondly, so many Muslims in the former Yugoslavia are concentrated in the former Bosnian Republic, 
which carries with it the reputation of being the most cosmopolitan of all of the former republics. As 
such, the overlap of ‘Muslim’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ may have masked the need for a designator of 
chauvinist Muslims. Finally, the term used locally for non-cosmopolitan Muslims is marked by its 
association to radical or extreme religious views (Mudzahedin, e.g.). As far as I understand, this term first 
emerged in the Bosnian context during the most recent war to refer to non-Bosnian fighters who had 
come from abroad to support the Muslim population. Since then, its meaning has expanded to refer to 
those who are more extreme in their religious views and less tolerant of other ethnicities and religions. 
That said, it primarily signifies its extreme religious views and secondarily signifies the chauvinism that 
can often come with those views. 
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in which it might express itself. One example of this is evident in the way ethnic identity relates 
to the term genocide for these local residents and the international visitors.  
While it is true for the most part that very few Serbs will use the term genocide itself to 
describe what happened to Muslims in July of 1995, the conclusions international visitors often 
draw from this are often errant, at best. As some international visitors suppose, Serbs will deny 
it because their leaders do—the groups are homogenous internally. The implication, then, is 
that they are guilty or blamed for it, and it is defensiveness of their own ethnic group that 
drives the denial. In some or even many cases, this might be even true. But, in fact, many 
Serbian people in Srebrenica will acknowledge the massacre and the deaths of the Muslims who 
are buried in Potocari17 but are reluctant to use the word genocide. 
If you ask Serbs in Srebrenica, “Was the intentional goal of the Serbian army to drive out 
all Muslims from the Srebrenica region?” most of them would answer yes, and without paradox 
or controversy. The reason many Serbs in Srebrenica will not use the term genocide is mostly 
because the term itself has been politicized. Another reason is that, because genocide for them 
refers to the Holocaust, they associate the term’s definition with sheer number of victims, rather 
than the intentional elimination of a group from a region. That is, they don’t deny the facts; they 
deny the word being used to describe it. But the presumed homogeneity within the group 
disguises the mere possibility of this kind of nuance from international visitors,18 while local 
 
17 Of course there are those who will even question these basic facts, but these truly are a minority. Others 
will simply refuse to answer the question, but again not because they deny the material facts. Instead 
they want to be able to speak about and gain recognition for their own losses during the war. 
18 I only began to appreciate this nuanced view a full three years into my tenure in the city, and that only 
because I asked a close friend who is Serbian that exact question. 
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residents’ heterogeneous understanding of ethnic identity renders the line of questioning 
confusing on multiple fronts.  
The other major difference between local residents and international visitors is the 
valence put to ethnic identity. For local residents, it’s mostly neutral. For many local residents, 
ethnic identity first and foremost inspires pride. Similar to the pride many humans around the 
globe associate with their homes, most Muslims and Serbs in Srebrenica take pride in their 
ethnicity. An important distinction, many from both groups consider this pride to be non-
chauvinistic. Their pride in their own ethnic group has nothing to do with other groups. It is not 
a comparison. It is merely pride in one’s heritage and culture.19 
Mostly, ethnic identity serves a sense making function in society. Ethnic identity can 
help someone focus their job search efforts; it can help them identify a life partner; it can help an 
employer choose an employee. It can even help people dismiss otherwise inexplicable slights 
and minor rude interactions. Ethnic identity can also help local residents prevent conflict from 
erupting. A person can, and usually does, avoid talking about politics or the war, for example, if 
they are in mixed but unfamiliar company.  
Thus, most local residents resent neither their own identity, nor the identity of others, 
rather merely understand it as a reality. That reality is harmless, up to the point of its use 
politically. Aside from that, ethnic identity seems mostly to grease the wheels of everyday life in 
mostly innocuous ways.  
 
19 It is important to note that there are chauvinists in both groups who do cast their ethnic pride with a 
comparative valence, one that is derogatory to other groups. I came across this in my ethnography, 
though it was rare in occurrence. That rarity is likely due to my position outside of the local municipality 
and the religious institutions. I experienced this chauvinism most when I was at the university, most 
often with professors and rarely with students. 
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As such, its valence is mostly neutral. For many local residents, it does not occur to them 
to think about their access to jobs or life partners as somehow unfair, unjust, bad, or negative 
because it is limited, to an extent, by that identity marker. Ethnic identity just is, without 
positive or negative, but rather neutral moral valence. 
Given their negative moral valence, international visitors struggle to see what else ethnic 
identity does in modern life in Srebrenica—an important marker for sense making for everyday 
life—and to situate it with other aspects of life that are also important. Coupled with groupism, 
they fail to see the nuances within the groups as well. The result is a general confusion in 
international visitors who cannot begin to understand how local residents can say they do not 
have a problem with ethnic identity at the same time they vote for a chauvinist politican or 
deny the losses of members of the other group. When international visitors remark that it is 
difficult for them to reconcile seemingly contradictory statements by local residents, it is likely 
because they are simply not understanding the term ethnic identity itself.  
Because for international visitors, ethnic identity is negative, when they hear, “We don’t 
have a problem with ethnic identity” they often equate it to suggesting that ethnic identity does 
not matter. But local residents aren’t saying that. They are merely saying they don’t use the term 
to create problems between people. On the one hand is the focus by international visitors on the 
catastrophic consequences attributed to ethnic identity. On the other is the foundational and, 
importantly, unproblematic role ethnic identity plays in everyday life for local residents. The 
two perspectives are so disparate that the one side can hardly see, and rarely even imagines, the 
possibility of the other. 
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This highlights a remarkable competency of these local residents to reconcile what to 
international visitors seem like many contradictions. For example, they say Srebrenica for them 
offers little hope of a future, but they are reluctant to leave. They say politicians are corrupt, but 
often these residents will vote for them. Ethnic identity isn’t a problem, they insist, but most of 
the political problems central to their understanding of Srebrenica is organized and understood 
through the lens of ethnic identity.  
This group of unaffiliated, non-political residents rewrite the dominant narratives into 
new forms and employ different language to resolve these contradictions. For example, rather 
than aligning one group or the other with the status of victim from the war, victim is a category 
not confined to ethnic characterization; for them, there were victims and aggressors on both 
sides of the war, and they employ more particular language like cetnik in order to place blame 
where they believe blame should lie. In contrast, international visitors lack this versatility, and 
as the next section demonstrations, this creates both tensions in interactions between the two as 
well as opportunities to influence.  
 Attempts to Influence Others’ Concepts 
Local residents and international visitors both tried to influence the way they related 
concepts in their knowledge about the city of Srebrenica. One young father reported to me that 
he believes that most visitors come to Srebrenica with the impression that what happened there 
couldn’t have happened in the place from which the visitor had come. He pressure tests the 
86 
causal relationships those visitors have about what caused the war in the former Yugoslavia by 
describing to the visitors what Srebrenica was like before the war.  
Nedim has tried many times to change the way that international visitors think politics 
is the solution to the problems in Srebrenica. He described it to me using an example of a 
situation he’s been in a few times. He remarked to me in his interview the numerous occasions 
on which he’s been speaking with an international visitor about the problems that face 
Srebrenica today. Invariably, the visitor will come upon the topic of the local spa and make a 
suggestion to the effect that the local residents ought to try to re-open it.  
In talking with international visitors about the fact that the spa is not open, Nedim will 
make the effort to explain to the visitor, firstly, that the local residents already do want the spa 
to open. But, it’s owned by one man in particular who cannot get the permits he requires in 
order to finish building it to open it. The visitor will invariably suggest that local residents make 
appeals to the local, regional, and entity governments. At that point, Nedim will begin to 
explain that, in fact, the problem is not a matter of just getting the support of the entity 
government. Rather, he explains, the entity government is the one actively trying to sabotage 
the opening of the spa. The visitor will certainly ask why, and Nedim will respond: because the 
owner is in a different political party than the party that is currently in control.  
Nedim has had the experience of trying to explain the local situation to so many 
international visitors partly because he seeks them out. He understands that the local situation 
needs outside help but is also frustrated by the myriad conversations he must first have with 
international visitors before they will understand from his perspective what is going on locally. 
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That is, he struggles to get them to change the relationships they have between concepts so that 
they match his.  
For example, there was a group of Italian youth who he felt never really seemed to 
understand him. He said that they had come to Srebrenica with really big expectations, but he 
could tell they did not understand the situation. After they implemented one week-long project, 
“[they] were really disappointed. When the festival was finished, they just said, this is not 
possible. This city cannot be helped. …And they ran away.”  
He said that he had tried to speak with them:  
We told them that we know exactly what [they] are talking about, and what kind of 
picture they would like to see, and change, and that we would like the same, actually. 
But that it’s a really long process here. Maybe more than fifty years you would need, for 
a start. And anyone who is not ready to handle all those challenges in that long process, 
in which a new generation will take over and continue, it is best for you to decide now 
that you won’t do it. 
 
With this group of individuals, he was unsuccessful in changing the connections they 
made between politics and the problems facing local residents today.  
Recall the exchange between Greta and Ahmed from Chapter 2. Ahmed had influenced 
Greta and the group with her away from an art installation that focused on the war, and toward 
something that captured their experiences in Srebrenica. He succeeded in influencing where 
and when Srebrenica became important to them; after speaking with him they wanted to do 
some portraits of the people they’d met.  
But when it came to their concepts, Ahmed was a bit less successful. As Greta and her 
group of friends thought about it, they became uncomfortable with the idea of painting 
portraits of local residents because the portraits were all of Muslims. Greta said, 
88 
I’ve just met the Muslim part of the population, so I think that I’m missing another part 
of the population in my experience here. So I still have some practical doubts 
about…how do people feel about it, both sides?  About their daily life, about their 
interactions, I mean, are there differences between the two communities? Are there any 
language differences? …I don’t have a clear idea about what it is really like to live here 
today. 
 
They talked with Ahmed about this, to gather his advice. He recalled that conversation 
and their concern that they didn’t have portraits of any Serbian people from Srebrenica. He 
recounted the logic of his response to them,  
…for me, it’s a kind of a strange thing, …if you look at it from international perspective, 
it’s kind of like a normal thing that they are asking…that what is important in each kind 
of project implemented is that there are Muslims and Serbs together. Well I see it as 
already a discrimination point from the institution that is asking you to make it. It’s 
already discriminating in the way in how it is thought because you already are making a 
discrimination between the two people.  
So in the moment that you have to count, I don’t know,…I have four Muslims and three 
Serbs, or four Serbs, or….It’s simply stupid from my point of view. While the important 
thing is that there are people. That is meaningful; it doesn’t matter what kind of 
ethnicity or religion they have. 
 
Greta’s discomfort related to ethnic identity and its representation in the city was not 
something he’d successfully influenced for her. Ahmed wanted them to focus more on the 
people in their art installation, but because she was uncomfortable with including only Muslims 
in the art installation, they focused instead on their experiences. However, he was not able to 
remove the relevance or importance of ethnic identity. He merely displaced their importance in 
the project.  Despite the change in output, she was still focused on ethnic identity in her mind, 
wondering whether she really understood everything because she hadn’t really interacted with 
any Serbs. She was concerned to ensure that any permanent art installation represent both 
Muslims and Serbs, despite his suggestion that it doesn’t matter because they are all human 
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anyway.  The practical output changed, but her concept didn’t. In this way, he was not 
successful in dislodging the centrality of ethnic identity as a concept.  
Marta and the youth represent a unique example of when an international visitor was 
able to dislodge the local residents’ connection of politics to all of Srebrenica’s problems. Recall 
that Marta had come to deliver a program, wherein the youth who participated spent a week’s 
time to learn to train their peers on finding alternative means of funding projects.  
Marta heard throughout the training that it is more or less impossible to accomplish 
anything in Srebrenica. But by the end of the week, more than a few of them had really changed 
their minds. What had changed? The project had sought to change the power the youth put in 
politics to stifle grass-roots initiatives for change. Typically, the youth rely on interactions with 
international organizations or philanthropists to provide them with enough funding for less 
than a modest salary and the materials they’d need to implement a project. Otherwise, they 
would rely on project proposals sent to organizations to whom they were unknown and 
unaffiliated. Or they would seek and be rejected for assistance from the local municipality 
because they were politically unaffiliated. So many times had they gone through this and failed 
to get the funds necessary, or received partial funding, that many of them felt assured they 
would not succeed.  
Marta had inspired the youth to understand their situation differently through the case 
of the week-long program. Their perception of Srebrenica was a place of no possibility, no 
opportunity, and no future. They were apathetic and they understood others like them to be 
apathetic as well. As noted by a local resident in an earlier interview from my Master’s 
fieldwork, they were “assured we will fail.”  
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But Marta asked them to look at resources from a different perspective, to be more open 
to possibilities of using what’s already around them. For example, doesn’t the local café offer its 
space to musicians to play? And hasn’t the municipality covered some costs related to a few 
projects in the past? What if everyone gave just a few marks to achieve a financial goal? In 
addition to asking them to think a little bit differently about the menu of resources available to 
the youth, she also provided examples, many of them of youth initiatives from around the 
world, sometimes in places in much worse situations than what the youth imagined for 
Srebrenica. In practice, what she had done was to displace the centrality of politics to others of 
their concepts and how they influence the future of the city. 
By the end of the week, most of the youth had changed perspectives. They believed they 
could achieve results. One of the youth involved in the program did go on to start several 
different projects, one of them an entrepreneurial venture that is gaining customers in all of 
Bosnia. Another of them has been involved in a major, multi-million Euro project that has taken 
a patchwork of individuals and resources and sewed them together to make a little bit of 
progress a little bit at a time.  
Slobodan said,  
When she showed this project in Brazil, you start to think that the whole of Bosnia 
doesn’t have that number of young people. And you, what makes you uncomfortable is 
when you try to connect that project with and to put it in a local context here in 
Srebrenica. The first thing that you think about is human resources. And without that I 
cannot achieve anything. But then you start to think during the week about putting the 
whole thing in the local context, and then you realize it is not a matter to copy and paste. 
It’s the matter to produce something here, to create something here. That’s doable in this 
environment. 
 
Zeljka said,  
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What we understood was that we have good resources but that people are stuck here, so 
they helped us to a little bit see things from a different view…They showed us 
something obvious…: we have good space, a lot of good people, and a lot of good 
opportunities. But we didn’t think so, so I think that this is the first that people from 
outside came and showed us something so simple which we didn’t see before. 
 
The one exception was Ana, who felt frustrated with every suggestion Marta made; she knew it 
would not work and Marta would just respond with another unlikely suggestion. Aside from 
Ana, though, Marta had successfully displaced the central role politics played in the city; in 
terms of this study, she’d changed the relationships these local residents had between their 
discursive concepts.  
Fenna, the journalist who worked with local resident Stefan, in reflecting on the totality 
of those interviews, mentioned that one thing that she says she finds it difficult to understand is 
“how it is possible that people are not more open to the feelings of the people on the other 
side.” In regards to her interview with Stefan in particular, she was perplexed.  
On the one hand, she says, he seems really tolerant, understanding, wanting to treat 
each victim as a victim. “That’s the more open-minded way of thinking amongst Serbs.” But 
what was difficult for her to understand was what he really thinks because when she tries to 
clarify what his own personal thoughts are about the genocide of 1995, she said,  
you never really get a clear answer because it always goes straight to, ‘but we have 
victims as well.’ And there it stops, and you can’t really figure out what their view really 
is because they…start comparing it with other victims, which then turns it into you 
know, a story that you can hardly explain. Because yes, there are victims on both sides, 
but we’re talking now about [the victims on the Muslim side], and not about the other 
side. But that’s always the answer when you talk about these kinds of things in 
Srebrenica. 
 
She felt she had posed the question to him (and others) but didn’t get an answer.  
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Stefan in his interview with me stated that he wanted to try to change the way she 
thought about victims in Srebrenica: “You know, like, it’s not that everything is black and 
white.” He wanted to try to help her understand both sides of the war. “We had no problems 
speaking about it, and I even tried to change her opinion...” He says he “tried to explain to her 
different stuff, you know, about that both sides had victims, and that, you know, we need to 
help each other.”  
He did so by giving her examples of Serb victims that were killed, giving the dates that 
certain crimes happened, and showing her what he considered to be evidence that crimes were 
also done to Serbs before. He had tried also to get her to go to the Serbian memorial ceremony, 
though she didn’t go. She had posed a series of questions to her interviewees, including Stefan, 
about the Muslim victims of the war. Fenna had been perplexed by a persistence she’d 
recognized in those she’d identified as Serbian to answer her questions about Muslim victims 
with reference to Serbian victims.  
During the interview, it seems that, in his own way, Stefan was answering her question; 
he was telling her what he really thinks, about the war, and about the victims of the war. But 
from Fenna’s perspective, which primarily focused on ethnic identity as an organizing device, 
marked by that groupist homogeneity and negative moral valence, she couldn’t see the answer 
he had given as any kind of answer at all. He was answering her question about Muslim victims 
with an answer about Serbian victims, giving her two answers in one. But she didn’t seem to 
recognize it. 
I asked Stefan if he felt that he had succeeded in influencing her; he said he did not feel 
as though she had understood him. And she confirmed in her second interview with me that 
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she did not feel that any of the local residents had even tried to correct a misunderstanding on 
her part, including Stefan, even though she says that he helped her to understand why Serbs 
think the way they do.  
Because their concepts were related to other concepts and to Srebrenica in such different 
ways, Fenna and Stefan were speaking past each other. He was trying to inspire in her an 
openness to the myriad opinions and feelings of people in his ethnic group, while she was, 
ironically, perplexed at the lack of such openness by his ethnic group. She’d posed a question he 
felt was invalid to ask him, and he’d answered the question he’d wished she’d asked. In 
Foucauldian terms, he tried to change the way she related some concepts to others (ethnic 
identity and victim, for example), but was unsuccessful in doing so. 
Giorgia was in the same group of Italians as Greta and her experience provides some 
nice contrast to the situation between Greta and Ahmed. In her initial interview, she said that 
she didn’t really know much about Srebrenica or the war and had come to find out more about 
the place and do this art installation. In particular, she was interested in drawing the portraits of 
local residents. But she was also sensitive to the fact that she had only been exposed to local 
residents through her connection to Ahmed. For that reason, she’d made a special effort to 
break free from the group at times in order to explore the city on her own. That took her to a 
local café for a few days where she’d seen a local resident, Ivan, sitting each day.  
At some point, they’d begun talking to each other after several days of seeing each other 
in the café. Giorgia shared with him her sketches that were eventually going to become part of 
the art installation. They began looking at the sketches together and Ivan started to give her 
some suggestions about a portrait she put together of a woman, one that she had intended to be 
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Figure 4.4: Giorgia's Drawing of the "Every Woman" 
 
From Ivan’s perspective, this portrait was a problem. It wasn’t a problem that, from his 
perspective, this portrait represented a Muslim woman. 20 “You draw a Muslim woman with 
that covering. I mean, okay. That’s okay. I respect that.” What he didn’t like was that it hadn’t 
included a Serbian woman as well. “But why don’t you draw a Serbian woman?...You are 
drawing a mural, and you are drawing a covered girl. That’s just one nation. Where are we 
[Serbs] here? Two nations.” For him, ethnic identity is not bad, but instead important. The art 
installation ought to have both nations in it because that’s the reality of local life. He was trying 
to get her to focus on an important concept. 
 
20 Worth noting, not all local residents see a Muslim woman in that sketch. Though she is covered, she is 
covered in a way that both Serbian and Muslim women cover themselves. Even so, Ivan is one of the local 
residents, and in this case, he saw the Muslim people represented and did not see the Serbian people 
represented. This could also be read as an example of that skepticism by local Serbs that the international 
world blames them all for genocide. He might have read into the portrait a Muslim woman because he 
was expecting it to be there. In any case, it’s difficult to make a conclusion here. 
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In this case, Ivan was not able to influence Giorgia to change the portrait to include both 
Muslim and Serbian women. He asserted the locally important concept of ethnic identity as a 
way of understanding the world, but she did not change the sketch to match his suggestion—to 
have two women drinking coffee together, one Muslim and one Serbian. And from Giorgia’s 
perspective, she did not even seem to recall that he had tried to influence her decision to include 
only one woman who was covered.  
Importantly, the difference was in the concept of ethnic identity. She wanted it to be 
‘every woman,’ presumably because to her ethnic identity, especially in the context of Bosnia, 
carries a negative valence. Recalling the interviews with Ahmed and Greta, Giorgia had already 
had conversations about ethnic identity, and at least one other in her group—Greta—was 
sensitive to the appearance of ethnicity. Because Giorgia’s intention was an ethnicity-free 
portrait, she was likely reluctant to add ethnicity, even if in equal parts as Ivan had suggested.  
Ljeposava is affiliated with a local organization that brings together private citizens, 
other organizations, international organizations, and really anyone else who is interested in 
participating. The purpose of the organization is to serve as a vehicle through which local 
people can voice their opposition to hateful incidents when they happen in Srebrenica. An 
additional mandate for the group is to intentionally make positive stories from Srebrenica 
newsworthy as an attempt to change, or at least balance, the dominant image of Srebrenica in 
the press. 
Ioana had come to Srebrenica through her connection with another youth-focused 
project and was living in the city for a few months at a time off and on. She was focused on 
working in this local organization and had spent a lot of time and energy planning events and 
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putting together marketing materials to try to increase interest in the events. A lot of these 
events were focused on creating those positive stories from Srebrenica. 
In the organization, there had been some debate about what the focus of the 
organization is, or should be, a problem that hadn’t been fully recognized or resolved. On the 
one hand, Ljeposava felt the organization must be focused on at least being a mechanism 
through which local residents and organizations could voice their stance against hate in the city. 
To her, it seemed useless to have another organization in the city if the only thing it would do 
would be to create positive events focused on, say, the environment in order to balance that 
dominant image of Srebrenica in the news. For Ljeposava, there were enough organizations in 
the city already doing that, and she had co-founded and led one of them. To her, the value of 
this organization was not in its focus or ability to create positive stories from Srebrenica. 
Instead, it’s value was that it could create power in numbers by being a vehicle through which 
peace loving residents in the city could voice their disapprobation of hate speech, especially by 
politicians, wherever it occurred. That is, Ljeposava was focused on creating a counterbalance to 
the politics problem in Srebrenica. 
For Ioana, the organization, by producing positive stores from Srebrenica, had power in 
directing attention. Rather than directing it at ethnic identity and hateful events that focused on 
the identity split, the organization should ignore those and make their point that way. For that 
reason, the organization should focus on only those positive stories, which they were creating, 
amplifying them in the media and on social media. That is, Ioana was interested in eradicating 
ethnic identity in the news media as a way to resolve the problem in Srebrenica. 
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It so happened that, at a time when Ljeposava was away from the city, the organization 
had been trying to plan events for the rest of the summer. They were circulating emails about 
what events to plan and when. Meanwhile, Ljeposava, who was receiving these emails, was also 
reading the news reports coming from Srebrenica: the political situation was in near complete 
chaos, with directors of different agencies being replaced nearly daily, retributions exacted, and 
the mayor making statements denying genocide, and doing that by claiming he was speaking 
for the Serbian people, rather than for his elected position as leader of Srebrenica.  
In reading the news reports and the email messages planning litter pickups and friendly 
races around the city rather than responding to that political situation the way she thought it 
should, she sent an email indicating her dissatisfaction with the lack of response. The 
organization was not living up to its mandate. For Ioana, the email from Ljeposava had also 
made an assumption about that mandate with which Ioana did not agree. The organization was 
to focus itself on the positive stories in the city. That brought this unresolved issue about what 
the organization stood for to a head.  
From Ljeposava’s perspective, silence in the face of hate speech had been a problem 
facing the city for so long. She understood that the silence of most people in these situations 
allowed politics to continue to be a problem and was precisely what had gone on so long and 
needed to change. In an effort to change that, she had become involved in this organization.  
From Ioana’s perspective, she felt Ljeposava was trying to exact some sort of revenge on 
the people whom she blamed for the problems facing Srebrenica today—politicians and people 
in the municipality, e.g. She understood this desire to reprimand the politicians for their hate 
speech and improper behavior as the same old focus on ethnic identity that had been employed 
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for years and had yielded no success. To her mind, the lesson should have been learned that one 
cannot continue to employ the same strategies and expect a different result. She was trying 
something new, but Ljeposava did not see that. 
Having spoken with both of them, it would appear that they both were actually saying 
the same thing—that the organization needed a new strategy. Part of the misunderstanding was 
that Ioana misunderstood what Ljeposava had been doing in the past, and what her intentions 
and strategy were now. [In fact, Ljeposava was not trying to enact revenge.] In addition, Ioana 
was very certain that her strategy—not focusing on ethnic identity—would be a more effective 
method. However, Ljeposava was trying to show her that politics was the problem, namely the 
political use of ethnic identity. Silence in the face of that politics had been their strategy for so 
long, and in her mind, was precisely what had contributed to the situation being as bad as it 
was that particular day. It was hate unfettered, unopposed.  
Neither Ljeposava nor Ioana was able to influence the other to change their minds about 
the proper mandate for the organization or the proper strategy to take in the city. Part of this 
was a matter of differences in level of knowledge about the city and its history since the end of 
the war. But it was also a matter of the two of them employing two very different perspectives 
on ethnic identity in the city. In terms of this study, Ljeposava’s primary organizing concept for 
understanding Srebrenica’s problems was politics, and Ioana’s was ethnic identity. Ioana was 
trying to eradicate ethnic identity, as she explained to me in her interview. On the other hand, 
Ljeposava was employing the local understanding of it as a profound aspect of everyday life 
that, put to political use, could have catastrophic consequences. Creating a counter-voice to its 
political use was, for her, the only viable response if anyone ever expected anything to change. 
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They both wanted the same goal, but they couldn’t cooperate because here again, they 
were so completely speaking past each other. Part of the inability to communicate was simply a 
difference in the knowledge sets they were using to inform their decisions and strategies in the 
city. But another part of the problem was the difference in the concepts they were using. For 
Ljeposava, ethnic identity is an essential element of everyday life, and can be used in both 
helpful and harmful ways. Ioana’s concept of ethnic identity recognized only that it was 
unfortunate and divisive. This had major consequences for their ability to communicate 
effectively to each other.  
100 
5.0 Chapter 5: Conclusion 
I have tried to describe two different discourses on Srebrenica as two different forms of 
discursive power in order to understand power without assigning hierarchies to those systems 
of power. I have looked at two discourses about Srebrenica that routinely come into contact 
with each other, which has offered up the opportunity to study how people whose discourses 
differ attempt to influence others and sometimes even succeed at doing so.  
By focusing on the objects, authorities, and concepts of both discourses, I have identified 
and described how the discourses are different and similar, and then looked at how local 
residents and international visitors use those objects, authorities, and concepts to try to 
influence each other. In this section, I analyze moments of success and failure at influencing 
others more broadly to draw some conclusions about the interplay between objects, authorities, 
and concepts, enabling some conclusions about both resistance and power.  
 Interplay Between Objects, Authorities, and Concepts 
On authority, Marta had come into the city with programming that relied upon the local 
residents’ understanding of the local situation. In that sense, Marta was an exception to the 
typical international visitor because the programming by its very nature presumed the local 
residents to be authorities on knowledge around Srebrenica. This was also one of only two 
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instances where local residents began to consider an international visitor to be an authority on 
the local situation. 
At the same time, this was one of only a few occasions where the international visitor 
was able to effectively change the relationships between concepts of local residents (with the 
exception of Ana). Marta had dislodged the centrality of politics and its hold over the future of 
the city in a way that inspired a few of them to action. They readily admitted she’d changed 
their perspectives, and a few of them who otherwise would have felt powerless actually did go 
on to implement projects they perhaps otherwise wouldn’t have pursued. This anecdote 
suggests the impact that granting authority to someone else can have on your own ability to 
influence them.  
Nedim has put a lot of energy into trying to influence international visitors. I do not 
have an account of how successful he’s been in influencing international visitors’ understanding 
of why Srebrenica is an object of attention in the first place, though he indicated how often he 
has tried. He was successful, however, in influencing Lotte to see him as an authority, but it’s 
important to note that in this situation, another international visitor had in the same moment he 
asserted himself to Lotte, reinforced deference to the local knowledge. It’s hard to tell whether 
Lotte’s reaction would have been different if that other visitor had not intervened. 
But also recall that Nedim did not, and Lotte confirms this, give her a better 
understanding of the local concepts. Instead, he simply influenced her enough to show her that 
she was not an authority on the topic and that he was. Importantly, at the moment he became 
the authority, concepts were no longer important. It was his understanding of the concepts, and 
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his understanding of logical relationships between those concepts, in the Foucauldian sense, 
that now mattered, not hers. 
Nedim had tried a similar strategy with that other organization from Italy but does not 
appear to have succeeded in changing their concepts. In particular, they were focused on 
awakening the people through inter-ethnic interaction, music, art, and other forms of culture. 
This was their way of attempting to help solve problems in Srebrenica, primarily by 
encouraging inter-ethnic connection.21 That he was not able to establish himself as an authority 
in their eyes perhaps limited his ability to influence the relationship they put to ethnic identity 
and the problems facing Srebrenica today.  
For Ahmed, he had seen some success in influencing how Srebrenica became an object of 
attention for her. When she came to Srebrenica, Srebrenica was an object of attention because of 
its past, specifically the war. But in interaction with Ahmed, she began to pay attention to 
Srebrenica because of its present and her experiences in it at that time. Ahmed had done this 
intentionally, and from Greta’s interview, it seems that he was successful. 
In contrast, when Ahmed put his energy to influencing how Greta understood ethnic 
identity, he doesn’t seem to have had the same success. While he did exercise influence over the 
project, it was proscribed to the project output itself, rather than to the mindset or image of 
Srebrenica that Greta held. In her second interview, she was still concerned that she hadn’t 
understood ‘both sides’ and still felt that ethnic identity was important.  
 
21 Worth noting, here and throughout all the stories I report here, is the presumption that interethnic 
interactions were lacking in the first place. While there are spaces in Srebrenica that are more clearly 
marked for one or the other group (e.g., religious institutions and a selection of cafes), the reality is more 
mixed interactions in daily life. 
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Importantly, I did not record any attempts by Ahmed to assert his authority about the 
local situation. In fact, Ahmed stated in his interview that he was intentionally trying not to 
influence the project too much. That he was not successful influencing the way she centralized 
ethnic identity could be related to that. He was limited by the authority she’d granted to him, 
probably by the fact that he was not an unbiased source of information, at least from Greta’s 
perspective.  
For Ivan, he had solely focused on influencing how Giorgia represented women in 
Srebrenica on the art installation. He wanted her to include two nations in the picture and felt 
that she had only included one. Giorgia, in contrast, had only included the one portrait, which 
to her represented ‘every woman’ rather than Muslim women. Ivan had not succeeded in 
changing the relationship Girogia had with ethnic identity; she did not change the portrait to 
reflect his neutral understanding of ethnic identity in Srebrenica. 
The interactions between Giorgia and Ivan were quite limited and focused mostly on 
just the drawings she shared with him. For that reason, I have no evidence to suggest that Ivan 
had even tried to influence how Srebrenica came to be important to Giorgia. He was suspicious 
of her, but he didn’t seem to try to influence it. He also did not seem to try to assert himself to 
her as an authority. That suggests that a narrow focus on just the relationships others make 
between concepts limits the chances of actually influencing them at all.  
Stefan had made a few attempts to change the way Fenna related the concept ethnic 
identity to Srebrenica and its past, in particular by demonstrating heterogeneity within groups 
and by trying to neutralize the moral valence Fenna put to the Serbian identity. Stefan’s logic in 
trying to influence her was targeting those logical relationships she had between concepts. He 
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was trying to complicate her connection of Muslim to victim and Serb to aggressor, to show that 
there were victims and aggressors on both sides. He was also trying to show that, as a young 
person, specifically a Serbian one, he should not have to answer for the Muslim victims and 
should receive recognition as a victim for the losses he’d personally suffered. 
But his strategy for influencing her struggled to break the connections she had already 
made between concepts. Firstly, the relationships she’d had was that Muslims were in the first 
place victims. She also seemed to place accountability for that on the Serbian side of the 
fighting. Stefan disagrees with both statements. So he was trying to complicate that picture by 
showing both victims and aggressors on both sides, and situating himself as an authority on the 
topic.  
But, Fenna had been to Srebrenica on several occasions before meeting Stefan, and she 
had lived in the former Yugoslavia for many years. For that reason, she seemed to see herself as 
an authority on Srebrenica and ethnic relations in the region. She did not see Stefan as an 
authority, and he actually recognized that himself and told me so in his interview. He 
sarcastically remarked that he hasn’t written a book about it, so his testimony can’t be trusted. 
In order for her to have listened and changed her concepts, he would have needed to position 
himself as an authority. Without having done so, he was not able to influence either the 
concepts or the authority she’d brought with her to Srebrenica. Once more, a focus on changing 
just the concepts, but not asserting oneself successfully as an authority, seems to have limited 
the success of Stefan’s discursive strategy.  
Neither Ljeposava nor Ioana was able to influence the other to change their minds about 
the proper strategy to take in solving problems in the city. Where Ljeposava focused on 
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counterbalancing what she saw as the problem—political use of ethnic identity, Ioana had 
focused on eliminating the prominence of what she saw as the problem—ethnic identity itself. 
They were employing two very different moral evaluations of it. Ioana explained in her second 
interview that she was intentionally ignoring it, as a matter of trying to eliminate it. On the 
other hand, Ljeposava understands it as a profound aspect of everyday life that, put to political 
use, could have catastrophic consequences. Creating a counter-voice to its employment was, for 
her, the only viable response if anyone ever expected anything to change. 
They both wanted the same goal, but they couldn’t cooperate because here again, they 
were so completely speaking past each other. Importantly, neither seemed to have tried to 
influence the authority they gave to each other, and neither of them particularly seemed to 
grant the other any sort of authority in any case. Part of the inability to communicate was 
simply a difference in the knowledge sets they were using to inform their decisions and 
strategies in the city. On this point, neither one could influence the other because, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, they disagreed on who could be an authority in this space.  
To summarize, my data shows successful and unsuccessful attempts by both local 
residents and international visitors to change the objects, authorities, and concepts associated 
with others’ discourses. In looking across objects, authorities, and concepts, a few conclusions 
are evident. First, it is clearly possible to influence another’s objects, authorities, and concepts. 
But second, success seems to come more easily to those who have established themselves as an 
authority in the other’s discourse. Third, influencing concepts seems to be the easiest, but rarely 
enough when attempted alone.  
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 Important Contextual Factors 
In isolating focus on objects, authorities, and concepts, I have intentionally scoped out 
some contextual factors, but because those factors also seem to be influential, I want to briefly 
highlight them here. In analyzing these and other instances of changed perspectives from my 
data, a few situational themes emerged that may be important factors in helping or hindering 
success in influencing others.  
On more than a few occasions, international visitors and local residents vocalized how 
much time they’d spent with each other or in the city. The sample of international visitors 
included those who had spent as few as several days in the town to those who had lived in 
Bosnia for more than eight years. For the majority of those who admitted that their perspective 
on Srebrenica had changed in their time in the city, they identified the length of their experience 
as an important factor. 
Even so, there were a few instances where length of time didn’t matter. For example, 
Greta had only been in country for a few days, but Ahmed had managed to influence her. In 
contrast, Fenna and Ioana had both been in the city and in the region more extensively but had 
been unaffected by attempts by local residents to influence their thinking. So while in some 
cases, it does seem important, in others, it seems that other factors were also at play. 
Another major theme that came out in so much of my data was the notion of friendship 
being important. Many of the local residents and international visitors who admitted that their 
respective others had influenced their thinking identified friendship as a contributing factor to 
that influence.  
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Importantly, where attempts at influence had not worked, friendship seems to have 
been absent. Fenna reported that she had built friendships with local residents, but Stefan, 
though he indicated he enjoyed hanging out with her, did not characterize their relationship as 
friendship. Ljeposava also indicated a general human affection for Ioana, but friendship was not 
a characteristic of that relationship either. The same was true for Giorgia and Ivan. Based on this 
data, friendship seems to be a highly influential factor; where it was mutually recognized, the 
attempts to influence the other were successful; where friendship was not recognized, the 
attempts were not successful.  
Another aspect of those who were influenced by their counterpart in conversation was 
the degree of humility or conscientiousness they had. Lotte struck me as an extremely 
introspective, conscientious, and reflective person. She shared with me her concern that she 
didn’t have a place in Srebrenica, because she didn’t really think that she had anything to offer. 
She often wondered what she could possibly do to help anyone in Srebrenica. 
Others who reported in interviews with me that they had changed perspectives, but 
with whom I did not have the benefit of observing their early interactions with local residents, 
shared this same characteristic. One international visitor reported to me that his perspective 
changed drastically; he felt that many international visitors, including himself, come to 
Srebrenica thinking of themselves as experts of some sort. For him, he realized that the Dutch 
people have a lot to learn from the people of Srebrenica. A local resident described him to me as 
the definition of what it means to be human, in the most progressive sense.  
This personal characteristic, when glaringly apparent to others, seems to have been an 
important factor. However, I do not have the benefit of identifying contrary cases; it would be 
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difficult to comment on the humility of others who didn’t seem to be influenced by their 
respective others. 
Another seemingly influential aspect of these interactions was the extent to which the 
goals of the residents and visitors aligned. In some cases, goal alignment was the product of 
successful influence (for example, in the case of Lotte and Nedim); in other cases, it seemed to 
be a catalyst for successful influence (Marta and the local youth). Finally, the more alignment 
between goals, it seemed there were fewer attempts to influence the other.  
Lotte and Nedim’s goals were aligned, but in that case it seemed to be a product of the 
influence that Nedim ultimately had over Lotte in terms of her recognizing him as an authority. 
When she began to see him as an authority on the local, the goals they shared were aligned such 
that Nedim was leading her through the local situation to an end he felt was appropriate for the 
city. In this case, goal alignment was an outcome variable.  
The alignment between what Ahmed and Greta wanted also seemed to be an outcome of 
the influence one had exerted over the other. Ahmed also talks about this in a way. He says it 
was really a great experience for him because they had come to do this project they wanted to 
do, but they also participated in a lot of his project’s activities. Their goals and projects aligned 
nicely, so he was really pleased with it.  
For Marta and the local youth, their goals were aligned—empowering the local youth to 
become successful entrepreneurs. Even though there was disagreement at the beginning of the 
week over what was possible in Srebrenica, and those first few days were marked by a lot of 
discounting of the visitors’ ideas by the local residents, ultimately, Marta was able to influence 
them, and her goals were aligned with theirs all week long.  
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Not just a few of the participants mentioned listening as an important aspect of their 
interactions. On the local side, Nedim reports that he thinks it is partially because Lotte listened 
that she was able to understand what’s really going on in Srebrenica. He contrasted them with 
the Italian group, who, he says, didn’t seem to be listening.  From the international visitor side, 
for those who recognized a change in their own perspective of Srebrenica, a few of them 
mentioned in particular that they tried really hard to listen. It was a conscious decision they’d 
made. 
In contrast, during a meeting that included Ioana and Ljeposava, Ljeposava was talking 
about her perspective about a few things that were related to the email conversation and the 
direction of the organization mentioned above. She was speaking in the local language, which 
Ioana doesn’t understand. Even so, Ioana reported that she left the meeting because she could 
tell from Ljeposava’s body language that it wasn’t good. So she stopped listening.  For this 
contextual factor we see again that when it was present, influence was possible. When it wasn’t, 
influence was not possible. 
Finally, probably the most important aspect of these interactions, especially those in 
which a local resident influenced international visitors, was the voice of another international 
visitor. In the case of Lotte and Nedim, Nedim reported that he had voiced his concerns about 
the plans that the Italian organization had presented, and that Lotte was present for that 
meeting. However, another international visitor followed on with a question to the group of 
international visitors as to why the plans hadn’t included the voices of the local residents. It was 
half an hour later that Lotte approached Nedim to talk about that, and her language in her 
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interview with me reflected that change in perspective. She indicated that she had put the 
authority for the project in the local residents’ hands.  
Others international visitors I interviewed also mentioned that speaking with 
international visitors from their organizations helped them change their understanding of 
Srebrenica. I can also report several occasions where international visitors sought out 
conversations with me during and after their visits to gather my thoughts and opinions on the 
local context. In all cases, I granted the request for that conversation after I conducted the final 
interview with the international visitor. In a few of them, it seemed their perspectives were 
influenced by my observations.  
But not in every case. Fenna stands out as on example. In addition, the Italian 
organization Nedim describes was in the same room when the international visitor challenged 
the plans that had been developed without input from the local residents. That was the same 
conversation that had been so influential on Lotte. But it seems it was not influential on them. 
So, the influence international visitors have is limited.  
It appears from this analysis that, while individuals can sometimes influence what 
objects get attention, and what relationships concepts have with each other, the most difficult 
thing to change in order to influence someone else’s image of Srebrenica is to change the 
authorities that person acknowledges. It is also the most powerful way of influencing others. I 
only documented this kind of success in two cases I studied. And in those cases, the people had 
also developed a friendship with their counterparts, were humble, had spent a good amount of 




To heed Abu-Lughod’s (1990) advice, I want to say a few more things about power here 
and what this study of power tells us about it. Based on this analysis, there are a few things that 
are important. First, Abu-Lughod and others have argued that different power influences 
people differently, at different locations, and at different times. This is a critical element of the 
methodology I use here. I take the assumption that this is in fact true and examine the 
discursive formations that inform the images local residents and international visitors have of 
Srebrenica. That is, different discursive power has influenced both of these groups. Using the 
methods and questions Foucault asks in The Archaeology of Knowledge, I was able to identify 
what those images look like and compare them one to the other. The critical first step though is 
the presumption that the discursive power, or the set of rules that produced their perception of 
Srebrenica, is different.  
It is precisely this difference that enables them to influence one another. In the debate in 
the literature on power, there is a preoccupation with the inefficiencies of power in producing 
its subjects. In that debate, it is that inefficiency that leads to the possibility of resistance. This 
study contradicts that logic.  
Instead, I have found that discursive power has formed perspectives on Srebrenica that 
are different. It is unimportant whether that power was efficient or flawed in creating its 
subjects. When those different discourses meet, as I have documented in this study, the 
opportunity for resistance emerges. But resistance is not separate from discursive power. In the 
most Foucauldian sense, discursive resistance is discursive power. Resistance is power; it is the 
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use of one’s own discursive formation (i.e., one’s own power) to influence the discursive 
formation of another.  
Second, by using a structured analysis of both of these discourses on Srebrenica, I enable 
a detailed comparison of the way that power works most effectively and where its softer, more 
malleable parts are. For example, based on this analysis, it appears that changing another’s 
objects is a relatively simple and effective measure to influence someone else’s perspective. 
More difficult is adding concepts to change the picture a person has of Srebrenica with meaning 
behind it. But changing the relationships one already sees between their concepts is even more 
difficult than that. It requires the work of decoupling concepts, such as ethnic identity being a 
primary organizing device, and then providing a replacement concept, which also requires 
mental and emotional labor. All of these are rendered even more difficult if one is not successful 
at establishing oneself as an authority in the eyes of the other.  
And my data show that there are a few contextual factors that are important in 
determining when that can be successful. Some are related to the person who is doing the 
influencing—that they are friends with their other, or that they have spent enough time with 
their other, for example. But some are related to the person who is being influenced, and that 
can be incredibly difficult to control in a productive way—that person’s humility or their 
acceptance of friendship, for example. 
Third, to the extent this methodology is fruitful in enabling a more detailed analysis of 
power, it also promises the possibility of a more strategic use of power. Knowing which aspects 
of power are more malleable, and what situational characteristics are important, one might 
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more thoughtfully deploy discursive power to influence others. One can imagine the strategic 
use of allyship, as an example.  
Finally, by detailing the objects, authorities, and concepts, one can, in my mind, more 
concretely understand what power is, and how it can change from one situation to the next. 
Take Foucault’s notion of ‘dispersion’ as an example. Understanding how many people endorse 
a particular perspective on Srebrenica can be rendered clearer when one knows the balance of 
people who share objects, authorities, and concepts.  
For example, the international perspective on Srebrenica is marked by all the objects, 
authorities, and concepts I’ve described up to now. To the extent that international visitors 
endorse those objects, authorities, and concepts, the power of the discourse is dispersed. On the 
local resident side, I also describe the same elements of their perspective on Srebrenica. The 
extent to which marginalized local residents endorse that image is the extent to which their 
discursive power is dispersed.  
But when we look at the way the one discourse on Srebrenica interacts with the other in 
specific micro-interactions, which I have done in this study, we can see that dispersion is only 
one aspect of power that does little to help us understand who in a given situation is more or 
less discursively powerful. Important to the equation is also the ratio of adherents to one 
perspective versus the ratio of adherents to the other in a given space at a given time.  
In Srebrenica, while international visitors often come to the city, in that space, their 
authority is not typically granted acknowledgement by the larger community in Srebrenica, 
marginalized or otherwise. Also in Srebrenica, the authority granted to the local, unaffiliated 
group of residents who endorse this particular image of Srebrenica is also not typically granted 
114 
acknowledgement in the municipal and religious centers of the town. But international visitors, 
to whom those power relationships within the city are usually invisible, grant at least some 
authority to these local residents, at least some of the time.  
That is, the dispersion of people who endorse the objects, authorities, and concepts 
common to a field of power signals something of the potential strength a particular discursive 
formation could have, but the actual strength seems to be more dependent on the density of 
those people in a given space at a give time. Also important to consider is the balance of people 
common to a field of power who hold access to material and social resources, such as 
institutions of government.  
This inspires a host of questions about power and ‘resistance.’ Is resistance really just a 
question of the use of discursive power to influence others who are subjects of different ‘fields 
of power’? This study would suggest so. Can we understand power by examining not the set of 
rules (the discursive formations themselves), but instead the components of those formations 
(objects, authorities, and concepts)? Again, this study suggests that this methodology is 
promising, and probably less intense of an exercise than studying the emergence of the 
discursive formation itself, which is what Foucault often did. Finally, does this approach help 
us formulate better strategies to influence others? These results suggest where discourses are 
most malleable and helps us understand that the dispersion of a discourse, and the ratio of 
those who endorse them in micro-situations, can help us bend the use of discursive power in 
favor of justice and equality. 
If so, I think this methodology has implications for many difficult relationships in 
society. To get at them, one must isolate and examine the objects, authorities, and concepts of 
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each perspective. That is an extreme act of empathy, one which requires understanding people 
with whom we disagree, to understand how they make sense of their world. It also demands 
that we understand the objects, authorities, and concepts we personally endorse.  
That has implications for all kinds of sociological questions. Imagine an analysis that 
identifies, for example, the differences in the objects, authorities, and concepts endorsed by, say, 
white women and women of color. How far could we go in understanding, naming, and then 
changing these otherwise seemingly impossible questions about gender and race?  
The other promise of this study is the ability to more concretely prove the impact that 
language has on the way we see the world around us. In that case, it becomes easier to name the 
effect power has on it, see how others think differently in very concrete terms, and then select 
strategies that seem to be more effective historically. This study shows, for example, that 
creating new objects of attention is easier than dismissing old ones, that creating new 
relationships between concepts is easier if they are not contradictory to old ones, and that being 
acknowledged as an authority is very difficult to do but yields powerful results in influencing 
others. So we have some direction as to what levers are harder and easier to pull for effective 
change, but also what impact those levers can expect to have in the longer term. That’s useful 
information, not only for pursuing this research further, but also for living an ethical life. 
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18 - 35 M Student Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Factory worker Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Tour guide/Entrepreneur Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Student Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M NGO employee Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Private citizen Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Farming/Subsistence Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Mother Local 1 1 
35 - 55 M Musician Local 1 1 
55+ F NGO employee Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Entrepreneur Local 2 1 
18 - 35 M INGO employee Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Medicine Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Student Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Musician Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Translator Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Musician Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Carpenter Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Student Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Student/NGO employee Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F Student Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Journalist Local 1 1 
18 - 35 M Carpenter Local 1 1 
18 - 35 F NGO employee Local 1 1 
35 - 55 F NGO employee Local 1 1 
35 - 55 M Bureaucrat Local 1 1 
35 - 55 M Journalist Local 1 1 
35 - 55 M Bureaucrat Local 1 1 
35 - 55 M Politician Local 1 1 
35 - 55 F Researcher International 2 1 
18 - 35 F Non-profit/ Peacebuilding International 2 1 
18 - 35 F Non-profit/Academic International 2 1 
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55+ F Philanthropist International 2 0 
18 - 35 F Student International 2 0 
18 - 35 M Filmmaker International 1 0 
18 - 35 M INGO/Peacebuilding International 1 0 
18 - 35 M INGO/Peacebuilding International 2 1 
18 - 35 M INGO/Peacebuilding International 2 1 
35 - 55 F Journalist International 2 1 
35 - 55 F NGO/Peacebuilding International 2 1 
35 - 55 M Private/Entrepreneur International 2 1 
35 - 55 M Private/Entrepreneur International 2 1 
35 - 55 F INGO/Peacebuilding International 2 1 
55+ M INGO/Peacebuilding International 2 1 
35 - 55 F Journalist International 2 1 
18 - 35 M Private business International 2 1 
18 - 35 M Private business International 2 1 
35 - 55 M Professor/Tourist International 2 1 
18 - 35 F INGO/Peacebuilding International 2 1 
35 - 55 M INGO/Peacebuilding International 2 1 
18 - 35 F Private/Tourist International 2 1 
18 - 35 M Student International 2 1 
18 - 35 F Architect/Tourist International 2 1 
18 - 35 M Graphic Designer International 2 1 
18 - 35 M Graphic Designer International 2 1 
18 - 35 F Artist International 2 1 
18 - 35 M NGO/Peacebuilding International 1 0 
18 - 35 M NGO/Peacebuilding International 1 0 
18 - 35 M NGO/Peacebuilding International 1 0 
18 - 35 M NGO/Peacebuilding International 1 0 
18 - 35 F Student International 2 1 
18 - 35 M INGO International 2 1 




Appendix B: Interview Questionnaires 
First Interview Questionnaire – International Visitor 
 
What do you think is interesting about Srebrenica today? 
Is identity an influential factor in your work? If so, how is identity related to your topic of 
interest and work? 
Does your method for achieving your objectives change based upon the local resident’s ethnic 
identity? If so, why and how? If not, why not? 
How important do you think ethnic identity is to the people whom you are interviewing? In 
what ways do you think it is important? 
 
Second Interview Questionnaire – International Visitor 
 
Did you feel engaged in the interactions? If so, why? 
Did you feel as if you understood the resident? Did she or he understand you? If not, why not? 
Did you feel that the local resident provided you with a better way of understanding their daily 
life? If so, in what way? What was the misunderstanding? 
Do you think residents were trying to get across a particular point of view with regards to their 
daily life? How did this interaction shape your understanding of their everyday circumstances? 
If your point of view changed, what is different? Does this additional information affect the way 
you will approach your work going forward? Why or why not? 
 
Interview Questionnaire – Local Resident 
 
What do you think is interesting about Srebrenica today? 
How well did you understand the questions the visitor asked you? What is your understanding 
of the work they are doing in Srebrenica? 
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How comfortable did you feel with the questions and statements made by the visitor? 
Did you feel engaged during the interaction? Would you have done anything differently? What 
was the most meaningful part of your interaction with the visitor? 
How well did you feel understood during the interaction? 
Did you feel you needed to correct the way the international visitor understood you or your 
life? If so, how did you correct it? 
Did your feelings change throughout the interaction? If so, how? 
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